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INTRODUCTION
In order to obtain financial sector stability, adequate financial regulation and
supervision are paramount. Despite their crucial role, both failed to prevent or
at least mitigate the financial crisis. While financial regulation strives to impose
a set of rules that ensure a safe and resilient financial sector, it has proven to
contain too many gaps and loopholes1.
Financial supervision, for its part, mainly aims to monitor whether or not the
financial sector abides by the relevant rules. When this is not the case, or when
financial stability is at stake, supervisors should be able to bring about an appro-
priate response. Across the globe, financial supervisors failed in their duties. The
financial crisis has shown that supervisors were not able to properly detect or
give warning of emerging problems.
In the EU, the mismatch between the financial sector and its supervision further
compounded the supervisory failings. The EU’s supervisory structure proved
unable to cope with the integration of the financial sector. Already by 2005,
23% of all banking activity in Europe was of a cross-border nature, largely
exceeding the levels of integration seen in the American and Asian-Pacific finan-
cial sectors2. Despite this increased integration and inter-dependency, financial
supervision in Europe had still remained almost exclusively a Member State
affair. A certain asymmetry has, therefore, grown between the financial sector
and its supervisors.
Such asymmetry between supervision and financial sector integration does not
necessarily impede effective supervision, but it does require intense cooperation
between the national supervisors. This was neither the case prior to or during
the financial crisis. When crucial decisions needed to be made at the EU level,
national responses, nonetheless, prevailed.
The supervisory failings led to calls for major reforms, which resulted in a set of
reforms that were fully put into effect in January 2011. It was welcomed as an
area of significant progress of the post-crisis reforms. This paper discusses the
EU financial supervision system that came about in the wake of the post-crisis
1. For the failures of financial regulation, see for example: BRUNNERMEIER, M., CROCKETT, A.
(e.a.), The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009.
For a discussion of the EU’s regulatory response, see: VERHELST, S., Addressing the financial crisis: the
EU’s incomplete regulatory response, Egmont Paper, nr. 39, December 2010.
2. SCHOENMAKER, D., VAN LAECKE, C., Current State of Cross-Border Banking, LSE Financial Mar-
kets Group Paper Series, Special Paper 168, November 2006, p. 8.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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reforms. By focusing on the powers and limits of the different supervisory levels,
it aims to assess the system’s chances of success.
In the initial chapter, the paper discusses the former supervisory system, as well
as its shortcomings. Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the reformed
supervisory system. Subsequently, EU level supervision is detailed, both in terms
of its macro-prudential arm (chapter 3) and its micro-prudential arm (chapter
4). The other parts of European supervision, both national and cross-border
supervision, are examined in chapter 5. The final chapter of this paper sheds
light on the state of affairs regarding international supervision, before a conclu-
sion draws together the relevant arguments and findings of this paper.
Stijn VERHELST3
3. The auteur is Research Fellow at Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. The author
would like to thank Professor Franklin Dehousse for his inspiring comments.7
1. THE FORMER EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY 
SYSTEM AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
The financial supervisory system that was in place on the eve of the financial
crisis was the result of an evolution that stretched over several decades4. It had
been influenced a great deal by the integration of the EU’s financial services
market. As often is the case, such integration has led to a harmonisation of the
legal framework. Such a harmonisation equally required defining the responsi-
ble supervisor (see 1.1). This legal framework poses certain difficulties pertain-
ing to the effectiveness of supervision and coordination between supervisors.
Therefore, limited supervisory cooperation arrangements have been put in place
(see 1.2). Despite these arrangements, financial supervision proved to be woe-
fully inadequate, as was painfully demonstrated during the course of the finan-
cial crisis (1.3).
1.1. The Legal Framework
In discussing the legal framework governing the EU financial supervisory sys-
tem, it is useful to separate the general legal framework applicable to the finan-
cial sector from the supervisory rules. The former is meant to result in a single
EU market in financial services, while the latter serves to deal with the related
consequences.
1.1.1. The basics of EU financial sector regulation
The EU legal framework governing the financial sector has been characterised
by two interrelated principles: minimum harmonisation and mutual recogni-
tion. Both principles are well-established in EU law. Minimum harmonisation
refers to the set of minimum requirements that apply to all financial institutions
operating in the EU. For instance, these concern capital requirements and risk
management5. Linked to minimum harmonisation is the principle of mutual rec-
ognition. This principle supports the free movement of goods and services in the
EU. For the financial sector, it implies that a financial institution duly licensed
4. A first Directive aiming at harmonising the EU financial sector rules was already adopted in 1973, see:
Directive 73/183/EEC, (OJ 1973 L 194/1-10). With regard to financial supervision, the Second Banking
Directive is of importance, as it introduces home country supervision (cfr. infra), see: Directive 89/646/
EEC, (OJ 1989 L386/1-13).
5. Most of the requirements are grouped in the Capital Requirements Directive, see: Directives 2006/48/
EC (OJ 2006 L177/1-200) and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2006 L177/201-256).RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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in one Member State obtains a so-called passport, by which it can freely provide
its services in the rest of the EU6.
1.1.2. Supervisory responsibility
The EU rules have important consequence for supervisory responsibilities.
Mutual recognition of financial institutions has resulted in home country super-
visory control7. It implies that a financial institution is supervised by the Mem-
ber State where it is licensed. This includes the supervision of cross-border oper-
ations, as well as the operations of branches in other Member States. For exam-
ple, the French supervisor oversees a French bank’s branch in Austria, as well as
its cross-border operations in Belgium.
Home country control largely reduces the supervisory role of the host country.
Supervision of the latter does not stretch much further than the supervision of a
branch’s liquidity provisions8 and the collection of information for statistical
purposes9.
The situation is different however when a financial institution sets up a separate
legal entity in another Member State, i.e. a subsidiary. As a subsidiary is con-
ceived and licensed on its own, it is supervised by the country in which it was
established. Nonetheless, the European harmonization process had facilitated
the setting up of a subsidiary.
The supervisory arrangements have become increasingly challenged by the inte-
gration of the European financial sector. A sector that operates across borders
requires an encompassing supervisory perspective. In an effort to adjust super-
vision to the increasing trans-national nature of financial supervision, the con-
cept of consolidated supervision has been introduced. Such consolidated super-
vision designates a supervisor to oversee the financial situation of a banking
group as a whole10. Supplementary supervision was put in place to allow super-
visors to carry out cross-sectoral supervision, comprising for instance both
banking and insurance firms11. These supervisory arrangements have in no way
taken away the prime role of national supervision.
6. Article 16 of Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the busi-
ness of credit institutions, OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, pp. 201-255.
7. Article 40 of ibid.
8. Article 41 of ibid.
9. Article 29 of ibid.
10. Articles 125 and 126 of ibid.
11. Directive 2002/87/EC of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions,
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate [Recast], OJ L 35, 11.2.2003,
pp. 1-27.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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1.2. Limited Supervisory Cooperation
Despite the legal arrangements in place, it was difficult for national supervisors
to have a complete image of the financial institutions under their supervision.
Cooperation between supervisors proved indispensable. For this reason, super-
visory cooperation arrangements had increasingly been put in place, both
among individual supervisors and at the EU level.
1.2.1. Cross-border cooperation
EU rules stipulated that the home country supervisor should collaborate with
the host state and provide it with the necessary information. While the rules
required cooperation between national supervisors, they did not alter the home
country supervisor’s competences12. In case of disagreement, the home country
had the final say.
In addition to EU legislation, supervisory collaboration and the common han-
dling of crises had been outlined in several ‘Memoranda of Understanding’
between Member States. However, these Memoranda are by no means legally
binding. This was particularly apparent during the financial crisis. Member
States were inclined to circumvent the established channels of cooperation and
opted rather for unilateral responses13.
Other, more elaborate ways of cooperation were equally developed, notably col-
leges of supervisors (see 5.1).Despite their potential, only a handful had been
created prior to the crisis. Those in place were still in their test phase when the
financial crisis broke out and thus proved to be of little use14.
1.2.2. EU level cooperation
The EU had already been attributed a role in financial supervision prior to the
crisis. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (grouping the national central banks and the
European Central Bank) with a role in supervision. It has been charged with
“[contributing] to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent
12. Article 42 of ibid.
13. CIHAK, M., DECRESSIN, J., The Case for a European Banking Charter, IMF Working Paper, July
2007, WP/07/173, pp. 6-7.
14. CEBS, Range of Practices on Supervisory Colleges and Home-Host Cooperation, December 2007,
Retrievable on: http://www.eba.europa.eu/getdoc/2a41c4f5-f76c-4c53-a790-fcd8cd129bbb/CEBS-2007-
75-(Range-of-practices)-final.aspx.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the
stability of the financial system”15. This function was mainly exercised by the
Member States’ central banks.
Nevertheless, a number of EU bodies have been created to support national
supervision. In the European Central Bank, the Banking Supervision Committee
(BSC) had been established. It groups officials from the ECB, the national cen-
tral banks and the banking supervisors16. As the Treaty stipulates, the BSC
assists central banks in two fields: the supervision of credit institutions and
financial system stability17. As the BSC was only to provide a supporting role, it
did not have any legally binding means at its disposal. The BSC’s role and com-
petences have remained unaltered by the post-crisis reforms18.
The 2001 Lamfalussy Report19 had an important impact on EU involvement in
financial supervision. The Report led to the creation of a four level structure to
adopt and implement financial regulation. Of this structure, the third level plays
a particularly pertinent role with regard to financial supervision. At this level,
three sectoral committees were put in place, grouping respectively the national
supervisors of the banking sector,20 the securities sector21 and the insurance and
occupational pensions sectors22. The tasks of these Lamfalussy level 3 Commit-
tees expanded over the years. Eventually, the Committees’ main tasks were (1)
facilitating mediation between supervisors, (2) contributing to the consistent
implementation of Union directives, (3) reviewing and converging supervisory
practices and (4) enhancing information exchange and supervisory coordina-
tion23. The Lamfalussy level 3 Committees were to pursue these tasks using non-
binding instruments24. Moreover, decisions by the Committees were to be made
by unanimity. Only when a consensus was not feasible could decisions – by way
of exception – be taken by a qualified majority.
15. Article 127(5) of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, pp. 1-388.
16. The Committee was established in 1998 and succeeded the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee,
which had been created by the Committee of Governors in 1990.
17. SCHELLER, H., European Central Bank. History, Role and Functions, European Central Bank,
2006, pp. 111-113.
18. This is contrary to the de Larosière Group’s recommendations, which proposed to replace the BSC by
the new macro-prudential supervisory body (see 3).
19. Lamfalussy Committee of Wise Men, Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets,
15 February 2001.
20. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), established by Commission Decision 2004/
5/EC of 5 November 2003, OJ L 3, 7.1.2004, pp. 28-29.
21. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), established by Commission Decision
2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001, OJ L 191, 13.7.2001, pp. 43-44.
22. The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), established
by Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 November 2003, OJ L 3, 7.1.2004, pp. 30-31.
23. See Article 4 of Commission Decisions 2009/77/EC, 2009/78/EC and 2009/79/EC (OJ 2009 L 25/18-
32).
24. See Article 3 of ibid.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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These bodies were not without any value. However their reliance on non-bind-
ing, soft-law instruments did not enable them to gain enough influence on finan-
cial supervision in the EU, let alone steer it through times of trouble.
1.3. A Multitude of Supervisory Shortcomings
In retrospect, it becomes clear that the pre-crisis supervision arrangements in
place had considerable shortcomings. Supervisors were unable to detect, signal
or mitigate the financial crisis and thus failed to perform their core tasks. At the
heart of this failure lies a multitude of mutually reinforcing problems. Some of
these are of a more general nature and apply to financial supervisors across the
globe. Other problems are more EU specific as they result from the EU’s super-
visory structure. The remainder of this chapter discusses these two prominent
problems.
1.3.1. Worldwide supervisory shortcomings
The EU was by no means alone when it came to inadequate and ineffective
supervisory regimes. In other regions and in international organisations, super-
visory arrangements also failed. Supervisory work did not result in sufficient
policy action. Each element of the supervisory process, from initial assessment
to policy action, had distinct weaknesses.
a. A lack of attention given to emerging dangers
Supervisors focused too narrowly on verifying whether or not individual finan-
cial institutions applied the necessary rules. They did not sufficiently take into
account the results of some general financial sector evolutions. Like regulators,
the prevailing view among supervisors was that market discipline and self-regu-
lation would be sufficient enough to ensure financial stability. Consequently, the
importance of aggregate risks and overall stability were not attributed the atten-
tion they deserved.
Worth noting is the lack of attention given to the adverse effects of financial
innovation. This is amply illustrated by the fact that financial institutions could
transfer risks associated with inferior quality subprime loans to other financial
institutions. By doing so, a financial institution – and the entire financial system
as a consequence – had to hold fewer buffers. Yet, risk did not evaporate as it
essentially remained in the financial system.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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The focus on individual financial supervision proved erroneous. The financial
crisis has shown that healthy individual institutions do not necessarily imply a
healthy financial system. Before the crisis, this fundamental understanding was
largely overlooked by supervisors25.
b. Incorrect assessment of emerging dangers by supervisors
Even if there was in general a lack of attention for the luring dangers, this does
not mean that such dangers were never given any thought. Several national26
and international27 bodies did evaluate overall financial stability and discuss
evolutions in the financial sector. At the EU level, the ECB published bi-annual
Financial Stability Reviews on the matter28. Nevertheless, when assessing issues
such as macro-financial stability or financial innovation, supervisors often did
not correctly assess the risks they entailed.
For instance, financial innovation was more often perceived as beneficial for
financial stability and its associated dangers were largely downplayed29. When
problems did arise, their potential impact was underestimated. The June 2007
ECB Financial Stability Review stated on the eve of the outbreak of the financial
crisis:
“With the euro area financial system in a generally healthy condition and
the economic outlook remaining favourable, the most likely prospect is
that financial system stability will be maintained in the period ahead30”.
The fact that the underlying dangers were overlooked or underestimated by
supervisors is not surprising. Supervisors face a difficult task. It is most challeng-
ing to detect adverse developments that can lead to financial instability. Super-
vision requires questioning conventional wisdoms, such as the advantage of
spreading risks throughout the sector. Even if a danger is detected, it is often
difficult to assess its potential scope. Moreover, as warning of a danger causes a
market reaction, it can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. In such cases, it is
25. G-20 Working Group 1, Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency – final report,
March 2009, p. 2.
26. By way of example: the Belgian Central Bank published annual reports on financial stability, Retriev-
able on: http://www.nbb.be/pub/06_00_00_00_00/06_03_00_00_00/06_03_02_00_00.htm?l=en.
27. See notably the IMF Global Financial Stability Reports, Retrievable on: http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/gfsr/index.htm.
28. For an overview of these reports, http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html.
29. A 2007 IMF paper stated for instance that “innovation has supported financial system soundness”.
See: BHATIA, A., New Landscape, New Challenges: Structural Change and Regulation in the U.S. Finan-
cial Sector, IMF Working Paper, WP/07/195, August 2007.
30. ECB, Financial Stability Review, June 2007, p. 9.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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tempting to fall back to what we know or believe, which might however lead to
an incorrect assessment31. To make matters worse, supervisors often lacked staff
and resources, making it all the more difficult to keep track with the fast-paced
financial sector evolutions32.
c. Warnings were insufficiently taken into account by policymakers
Although most supervisory reports failed to see the financial crisis coming, some
of them actually did warn of the unsound financial sector developments that
would eventually lead to the financial crisis33. Yet, policymakers either ignored
or failed to grasp the seriousness of these warning. Indeed, such warnings were
exceptions to generally positive analysis, but it would be short-sighted to see this
as the only reason why they were left unheeded.
Policymakers dislike warnings by supervisors, as such warnings run against
their short term interests. In many cases, such warnings concern core drivers of
economic growth. The real estate and financial sector are clear examples. These
drivers of economic growth rebuffed delocalisation and created well-paid
employment. Acting upon reports that warned of overheating or other related
problems would inevitably lead to a slowdown of short-term economic growth.
As a result, policymakers did not act on warnings. It became clear in hindsight
that doing nothing proved to be even more detrimental34.
1.3.2. The EU supervisory system’s shortcomings
The worldwide supervisory failures should not distract us from the EU specific
failings. The supervisory system proved unable to cope with the integration of
the financial sector. This increasing integration of the European financial sector
is illustrated by the fact that over 200 cross-border banks mergers and acquisi-
tions took place in the EU between 2000 and 2007. In the same period, euro-
zone cross-border interbank loans increased from 23% to 33% of total euro-
31. Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis,
2009, p. 39.
32. Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability, 2009, p. 16.
33. See for example: OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 2007/2, No. 82, 2007; OECD, Are House Prices
Nearing a Peak?: A Probit Analysis for 17 OECD Countries, OECD Economics Department Working
Papers, No. 488, 2006; FED, press release on tighter standards for loans to households to avoid “preda-
tory lending”, 12 December 2001; BIS, Financial system and macroeconomic resilience, Sixth BIS Annual
Conference 18-19 June 2007, BIS Papers No. 41, 2007.
34. OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2010, p. 144.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
14
zone interbank loans35. Already by 2005, 23% of all banking activity in Europe
was considered to be of a cross-border nature36.
While the financial sector was increasingly outgrowing national borders, super-
vision remained largely an affair of individual Member States. It might be pos-
sible to overcome such an asymmetry by smooth, extensive and honest cooper-
ation. This, however, was clearly lacking. Both the quantity as well as the quality
of supervisory cooperation was insufficient.
a. A lack of supervisory cooperation
The first major problem linked to European supervisory cooperation was the
simple lack thereof. A number of problems hampered supervisory cooperation.
First of all, cross-border cooperation was in many respects a mere supplement
to supervision by the Member States. Here, the voluntary nature of such coop-
eration played a vital role. The home country remained firmly in control. Host
state supervisors were left insufficiently involved in the supervisory decisions.
Moreover, they were not able to adequately challenge the home supervisor’s
decision. EU mediation remained non-binding. Consequently, supervisory deci-
sions concerning cross-border financial institutions did not need to be made in
consensus. This reduced the perceived need for supervisory cooperation.
Furthermore, supervisory cooperation was hampered by differences in national
financial regulation and national supervisory arrangements. While EU legislation
had approximated financial regulation in many respects, it did not result in full
harmonisation. Member States were often left policy options to differentiate their
particular stances. Striking are the Member States’ different definitions of a credit
institution, as well as of regulatory capital, two core elements of financial regu-
lation. In many other domains, regulatory differences persisted as well37. The
differences in financial regulation created an incentive for regulatory arbitrage,
i.e. financial institutions could seek the least intrusive regulatory framework.
Member States who feared – or on the contrary tried to benefit from – regulatory
arbitrage were inclined to limit the level of regulatory requirements38. There was
35. ECB, EU Banking Structures, September 2010, pp. 15-21.
36. SCHOENMAKER, D., VAN LAECKE, C., Current State of Cross-Border Banking, LSE Financial
Markets Group Paper Series, Special Paper 168, November 2006, p. 8.
37. Report High-level group on financial supervision in the EU chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 25 Febru-
ary 2009, p. 28.
38. See: TABELLINI, G., Why did bank supervision fail?, pp. 45-47, In The First Global Financial Crisis.
of the 21st Century, VoxEU Publication, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2008, 193p., Retrievable
on: http://www.voxeu.org/reports/subprime/report.pdf.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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also the practice of ‘gold-plating’, by which Member States could introduce more
strict rules if they wished so.
Differences with regard to supervision were equally present, with the structure,
methods and competences of national supervisors differing considerably. Some
Member States had one national supervisor, while others had four39. Supervi-
sors sometimes operated independently, while others did not. The possibilities
to enforce decisions made by supervisors differed as well. These differences in
regulatory requirements and supervisory arrangements made cooperation
among supervisors all the more difficult.
Moreover, supervisors were too often neither transparent nor honest towards
one other. They were reluctant to share information, which was often com-
pounded by confidentiality issues. There was equally a lack of openness about
difficulties in national financial sectors, especially in times of crisis. This under-
mined mutual trust, which only made matters worse40.
b. Failure of supervisory cooperation
Besides being too infrequent, supervisors were often unable to make swift and
practicable common decisions. The non-committal nature of supervisory coop-
eration again played an important role. Moreover, in order to preserve Member
State sovereignty, EU level supervisory bodies were only to make decisions when
there was a large consensus. These rules resulted in cumbersome discussions.
The consequence was often an unwieldy compromise or no agreement at all41.
The failure of supervisory cooperation became even more apparent during the
financial crisis. Because supervisory cooperation was cumbersome, national
supervisors preferred national responses. The different kinds of short-selling
restrictions applied by a number of Member States are a prime example42. The
inability to agree on a common supervisory approach proved even more detri-
mental when supervisors had to deal with difficulties in cross-border financial
institutions. Crisis management arrangements proved to be inadequate and
unworkable. In most instances, national supervisors were unable to agree on
39. ECB, Recent Developments in Supervisory Structures in the EU Member States, October 2006, p. 5.
40. The de Larosière Report, op. cit. footnote 37, p. 41.
41. CEPS, Concrete Steps Towards More Integrated Financial Oversight. The EU’s Policy Response to the
Crisis, CEPS Task Force Report, 2008, p. 30.
42. EFC High-Level Working Group on Cross-Border Financial Stability Arrangements, Lessons from the
financial crisis for European financial stability arrangements, 8 July 2009, p. 10. During the eurozone
sovereign debt crisis, the same problem occurred again, as Germany unilaterally restricted short selling,
see: the General Decrees of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) of 18 May 2010.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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swift common action or on how to share the burden between the Member
States. Even if they initially did reach an agreement, it was sometimes not
abided. This was illustrated by the Fortis-case, where the initial agreement
between Member States quickly fell apart and resulted in national crisis man-
agement. Such responses were far from optimal from a cross-border point of
view43.
c. Resulting home country supervision problems
Due to the aforementioned ineffectiveness of cross-border supervisory coopera-
tion, the problems linked to home country supervision came to the surface. It is
only logical that national supervisors are primarily concerned with securing
their own national financial sector. Due to the ineffectiveness of supervisory
cooperation, this led to a disregard of the situation in other Member States.
Ultimately, banks were global in life, but national in death or rescue from
death44.
The most apparent problem was the inadequacy of branch supervision arrange-
ments, clearly demonstrated by the failure of several Icelandic banks45. The host
country supervisors in the UK, the Netherlands and other Member States had
few supervisory competences over the branches of Icelandic banks. Yet, as the
Icelandic banks and their branches failed, the host countries had to bear most of
the costs46.
Although less visible, supervision of subsidiaries had its own set of problems.
Financial groups were inclined to centralise certain functions, such as risk and
liquidity management. As a result, it often proved difficult to separate a subsid-
iary from the rest of the financial group. This reduced the efficiency of supervi-
sory control47.
43. FONTEYNE, W., et. al., Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System, IMF
Working Paper, WP/1070, pp. 14-15.
44. The Turner Review, op. cit. footnote 31, p. 36.
45. Iceland is a Member of the European Economic Area and its financial institutions can thus access the
EU market.
46. The Turner Review, op. cit. footnote 31, p. 38.
47. EFC, Lessons from the financial crisis, op. cit. footnote 42, p. 14.17
2. OVERVIEW OF THE RENEWED EU FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISORY SYSTEM
In light of the above, it becomes clear that the EU’s supervisory arrangements
were too limited to ensure a stable and resilient financial sector. Such an ineffec-
tive financial supervisory regime is incompatible with a well-functioning inter-
nal market. As the negative effects of the financial crisis grew, so did the willing-
ness to modify the supervisory system. This led to a set of reforms (2.1). The
resulting supervisory system is in several respects significantly different from the
previous one, although basic supervisory responsibilities have been left largely
unchanged (2.2).
2.1. The Road towards a Renewed Supervisory 
System
Supervisory reforms were carried out across the globe. The G-20 provided an
important impetus for these reforms48. In the EU, a first step towards a new
supervisory system was made at the October 2007 ECOFIN council. Finance
ministers then agreed on a roadmap for strengthening financial stability49. Nev-
ertheless, the roadmap envisaged little in terms of major reform. It was mostly
aimed at improving voluntary cooperation among supervisors, resulting in a
number of changes to the supervisory arrangements50.
The 2009 Report by the de Larosière High-level Group proved to be of more
importance. The group had been mandated by the Commission President to
propose measures that would establish “a more efficient, integrated and sustain-
able European system of supervision51”. The proposed measures served as an
important basis for the Commission’s proposals later that year52. Finally, in Sep-
48. See amongst others: G-20, Declaration. Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Wash-
ington, 15 November 2008 and G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London, 2
April 2009.
49. Annex II of Council of the European Union, Press Release of 2822nd Council Meeting, 9 October
2007, 13571/07.
50. Directive 2009/111/EC of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and
2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures,
supervisory arrangements, and crisis management, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, pp. 97-119.
51. The de Larosière Report, op. cit. footnote 37, p. 61.
52. A communication was published in May 2009, see: COM (2009) 252 final. It was followed by a set of
legislative proposals in September 2009. For macro-prudential supervision, see COM (2009) 499 final
and COM (2009) 500 final. For micro-prudential supervision, see: EBA, COM(2009) 501 final; EIOPA,
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tember 2010, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement
on a legislative package that redesigned the financial supervision system53.
2.2. The Resulting Supervisory System
The reforms have fully entered into force in January 2011. As was the case
before, the renewed system consists of three levels of supervisors: the EU, the
cross-border and the national level. Their tasks and means of operation and
cooperation have nevertheless undergone significant change.
The reforms have notably led to the creation of the European System of Finan-
cial Supervision (ESFS), which consists of both the national supervisory author-
ities and the European supervisors54. Cross-border supervisors remain outside
of the ESFS, but equally play a noteworthy role in the renewed financial super-
visory system. Figure 1 provides an overview.
Figure 1: The EU financial supervision structure
EU level supervision has been assigned a bigger role than was previously the
case. It now comprises two types of supervision. The first type is macro-pruden-
tial supervision, which aims to monitor the overall stability of the financial sys-
tem and identify potential systemic risks. This task is carried out by the Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is discussed in the following chapter.
The second type of EU level supervision is concerned with micro-prudential
53. See: Directive 2010/78/EU, Regulations 1092/2010, 1093/2010, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010 and
Council Regulation 1096/2010, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1-164.
54. Article 1(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, op. cit. footnote 103.
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issues, i.e. the individual financial institutions. To this extent, three European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have been created, each responsible for a seg-
ment of the financial sector (see 4.)
At the cross-border level, the colleges of supervisors have been attributed a more
significant role than was the case before the supervisory reform. A college of
supervisors brings together the different supervisors of the Member States in
which a given financial institution or conglomerate operates. They have been
made mandatory for cross-border financial groups. This should stimulate coor-
dination and collaboration among supervisors (see 5.1).
And finally, national level supervisory responsibilities have undergone change,
albeit to a lesser degree. Notably, home country supervisors are now obliged to
take into account the potential impact their decisions may have on fellow Mem-
ber States. Furthermore, the concept of significant branches has been intro-
duced, so as to reinforce cooperation between home and host supervisors. These
minor changes, as well as the reinforcement of cross-border and EU supervision,
have not altered the fact that home country supervisors remain in firm control
of financial supervision (see 5.2).21
3. EU MACRO-PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
One of the major innovations brought about by the new supervisory set-up is
the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is an EU level
body responsible for macro-prudential supervision. The ESRB’s mission is to
prevent or at least mitigate systemic risks that threaten to disrupt financial sta-
bility. In light of the failures of pre-crisis financial supervision, such a body is
much-needed.
This chapter will initially discuss the ESRB’s structure (3.1), followed by an
overview of its tasks (3.2) and the decision-making rules (3.3). The chapter con-
cludes by analysing the limits of the EU macro-prudential body (3.4).
3.1. Structure
The ESRB is the sole EU level macro-prudential supervisor, but remains without
a legal personality. It has a diverse internal structure, which given its lacks of
binding powers, is all the more important (see infra). The ESRB comprises a
General Board, a Steering Committee, a secretariat and two Advisory Commit-
tees. Figure 2 provides an overview of this structure, which is further discussed
below.
Figure 2: Structure of the European Systemic Risk Board
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3.1.1. General Board
The General Board is the central decision-making body of the ESRB. It meets at
least four times a year. In total, the General Board has 66 members, which can
be seen as considerably large. In case of future EU enlargement, the number of
members will be further increased. Of its 66 members, 37 have voting rights.
The members with voting rights are:
• the President and the Vice-President of the ECB;
• the 27 Governors of the national central banks;
• a member of the European Commission;
• the Chairpersons of the three European Supervisory Authorities (see 4.);
• the Chair and two Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee (see
infra);
• the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee (see infra).
In addition, a representative of each Member State’s relevant national supervi-
sory authority, the President of the Economic and Financial Committee and the
Head of ESRB secretariat55 attend the meetings of the Board. They do however
not have voting rights56.
The Chair of the General Board plays a crucial role in the ESRB. During the
legislative negotiations, the Parliament demanded the President of the ECB to be
the Chair of the General Board, while non-eurozone countries opposed the idea.
As a compromise, the President of the ECB chairs the General Board, but only
during its first five years. The future review of the ESRB (set to take place in
2014 after green light from the Parliament and the Council) should lead to more
permanent rules for determining the Chair57.
As a means of counterbalancing the eurozone Chair, the election of the General
Board’s First Vice-Chair takes into account the need for a balanced representa-
tion between eurozone and non-eurozone countries58, implicitly implying that
the First Vice-Chair should be a non-eurozone representative59. The Second
Vice-Chair annually rotates between the EU micro-prudential supervisory bod-
ies’ Chairpersons60.
55. See 3.1.3.
56. Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-pru-
dential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, OJ L 331,
15.12.2010, pp. 1-11.
57. Article 5(1) of ibid.
58. Article 5(2) of ibid.
59. This is indeed the case, as the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Mervyn King, has been elected
First Vice-Chair of the ESRB. For more detail on the EU bodies’ nominations, see the Annex.
60. Article 55(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, op. cit. footnote 102.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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3.1.2. Steering Committee
The Steering Committee is to prepare meetings and decisions of the General
Board. It has 14 members with voting rights. These members are:
• the Chair of the General Board;
• the First Vice-Chair of the General Board;
• the Vice-President of the ECB;
• four other members of the General Council of the ECB (i.e. governors of
national central banks or the president of the ECB);
• a member of the European Commission;
• the President of the Economic and Financial Committee;
• the Chairpersons of the three European Supervisory Authorities (see 4.);
• the Chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee (cfr. infra);
• the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee (cfr. infra)61.
In addition, the Head of the ESRB secretariat attends the Steering Committee’s
meeting62, bringing the total number of members to 15. As the size of the Gen-
eral Board risks affecting its functioning, the smaller Steering Committee is
likely to play a crucial role in the functioning of the ESRB.
3.1.3. The Secretariat
A secretariat is to support the ESRB in its administrative and analytical func-
tioning. As of early 2011, the secretariat was comprised of more than 20 staff
members63. Importantly, this secretariat is financed and staffed by the ECB, not
the ESRB. The ECB is even authorised to appoint the Head of the ESRB secre-
tariat. By attending all the ESRB’s meeting, this person plays a crucial role64.
The dominant role of the ECB in the secretariat clearly amplifies its role in the
ESRB. For this reason, non-eurozone Member States have expressed their con-
cern about the ESRB being disproportionately focussed on the eurozone65.
61. Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.
62. See 3.1.3.
63. TRICHET, J., Introductory Statement – Hearing on the ESRB before the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, 7 February 2011.
64. Article 3 and 4 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010 conferring specific
tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board,
OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, pp. 162-164.
65. Treasury Committee of the UK House of Commons, Opinion on Proposals for European Financial
Supervision, Session 2008-09, Sixteenth Report, 2009, pp. 19-20.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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3.1.4. Advisory Committees
The General Board and the Steering Committee have two advisory committees
at their disposal: the Advisory Scientific Committee and the Advisory Technical
Committee. Both are to provide specific input to the ESRB, although their exact
role remains murky.
The Advisory Scientific Committee is composed of 15 non-governmental
experts, in addition to the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee and the
Head of the ESRB secretariat66. The non-governmental experts include academ-
ics, as well as representatives from the industry, trade unions and consumer
organisations67. According to its mandate, the Advisory Scientific Committee is
to review and design macro-prudential analysis and policy tools68.
The Advisory Technical Committee for its part is a bulky body that includes
over 60 public experts, i.e. a member of the Advisory Scientific Committee, the
Head of the ESRB secretariat69 and representatives of the central banks,
national supervisors, the ESAs, the Commission and the Economic and Finan-
cial Committee70. Like the Scientific Committee, the Advisory Technical Com-
mittee is to review methodologies and policy tools. Furthermore, it is to contrib-
ute to the review of financial stability and macro-prudential policy decisions. It
can equally provide opinions on EU directives71.
3.2. Tasks
As aforementioned, the ESRB’s mission is to supervise the financial system in
order to prevent or mitigate systemic risk. Systemic risk is a broad concept,
which the Regulation defines as “a risk of disruption in the financial system with
the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and
the real economy72“. This definition remains vague about the precise nature of
a systemic risk, giving little detail on what constitutes a disruption or what sep-
arates serious negative consequences from more benign ones. This ambiguous
66. See 3.1.3.
67. Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.
68. ESRB, Mandate of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board, 20 Janu-
ary 2011, Retrievable on: 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ASC-mandate.pdf?b35a0459c4d622aea129dc229333cef3.
69. See 3.1.3.
70. Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.
71. ESRB, Mandate of the Advisory Technical Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board, 20 Janu-
ary 2011, Retrievable on: 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ATC-mandate.pdf?9abc3c2829b7c876cedc58f651c09d45.
72. Article 2(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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definition might to some extent be deliberate, allowing the ESRB to adapt to
future evolutions. Yet, it equally casts doubts on the exact scope of the ESRB’s
mission.
To perform its challenging and somewhat undefined mission, the ESRB is to
carry out the following tasks: 1) supervision of the financial system; 2) emit
warnings and recommendations; 3) provide follow-up on its recommendations
and 4) report and interact with other supervisors.
3.2.1. Supervision
The prime task of the ESRB is to supervise and detect potential or existing sys-
temic risk in the financial system. In order to identify whether the impairment
of an element of the financial system constitutes a systemic risk, the ESRB is to
take the entity’s size, substitutability, interconnectedness and vulnerability into
account. The Regulation stresses that every part of the financial system has the
potential to be systemically important73. This still does not properly clarify the
ESRB’s supervisory scope. At any rate, assessing the importance of a risk or a
financial institution is not an exact science. The ESRB therefore has some leeway
when performing its supervisory task, which it will undoubtedly use.
Despite its major supervisory task, the ESRB is not allowed to perform direct
supervision, i.e. demand information from individual financial institutions. It
relies completely on data collected by external sources. A strict hierarchy for
obtaining information has been put in place. In first instance, the ESRB is to use
existing statistics available at the EU level. If this does not result in the needed
information, it can request information from the ESAs and subsequently from
central banks, national supervisors or national statistical authorities. If all other
options prove insufficient, the ESRB can, as a last resort, request information
from Member States.
Importantly, the information provided to the ESRB is to be summarized, so that
it does not allow for the identification of individual financial institutions. The
ESRB is only allowed to obtain information on individual financial institutions
if it has received the explicit authorisation by the relevant EU micro-prudential
supervisor74. Confidentiality of data and the willingness to avoid duplicated
reporting have clearly played an important role in defining these rules. They do
nevertheless make the ESRB’s role all the more complicated.
73. Recital 27 of ibid.
74. Article 15 of ibid.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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3.2.2. Emitting warnings and recommendations
If during its supervision, the ESRB finds that there is a significant risk of sys-
temic failures or reduced resilience of the financial system (a less demanding
requirement), it can emit warnings and recommendations. These are colour-
coded, so as to indicate the level of urgency. Warnings and recommendations
can be addressed to the EU as a whole, as well as to one or more ESAs, national
supervisors or individual Member States. However, the ESRB cannot address
warnings or recommendations to financial institutions75. In any case, the ESRB
is to inform the Council and the Commission of all warning and recommenda-
tion it issues76.
A clear limitation for the ESRB is that its warnings and recommendations are
non-binding. To increase the impact of its recommendations and warnings, the
ESRB can nonetheless decide to make them public. This ‘name-and-shame’
option should be regarded as the ESRB’s ultimate weapon, only to be employed
when all else fails. During the drafting of the Regulation, policymakers rightly
feared that making warnings public could have unintended side effects, such as
panic in the financial market. Making recommendations and warnings public
has therefore been subject to more demanding decision-making rules (cfr.
infra)77. The ability to make its messages public should by no means be viewed
as a replacement for binding rules78.
3.2.3. Follow-up of recommendations
An adequate follow-up of recommendations needs to compensate for the non-
binding nature of the instrument. Those subject to recommendations should
communicate the corrective actions they take or explain the lack thereof. This
requirement is referred to as the ‘act-or-explain’ approach. In addition, the
ESRB is to inform the appropriate bodies when it deems that insufficient meas-
ures have been taken in response to a recommendation79.
In contrast to recommendations, no formal follow-up is foreseen for warnings.
While it is true that warnings cannot strictly follow an ‘act-or-explain’ approach
75. Article 16 of ibid.
76. If addressed to a national supervisor, the warning or recommendation should also be transmitted to
the ESAs.
77. Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.
78. To this extent, the Irish Broad Economic Policy Guidelines are instructive. In 2001, the Council pub-
licly stated that it found the Irish budget to be expansionary and pro-cyclical and stated that Ireland
should take actions. Despite the public nature, Ireland largely disregarded these recommendations. See:
Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the 2329th Council meeting, 12 February 2001, 5696/01.
79. Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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(as they do not necessarily contain specific calls for action), the lack of formal
follow-up can hamper its intended impact. The effect of a warning is thus less
certain and will depend even more on the subject in question’s willingness to
take them into account.
3.2.4. Reporting and contact with other public bodies
The ESRB is to report on its activities, both to the public and to the EU Institu-
tions. First of all, the ESRB is required to publish an annual public report. This
report should contain an analysis of financial stability, as well as all information
that has been made public by the General Board. The ESRB is however not
required to provide information on its non-public work, not even in an ex-post
manner. This could render the core of the ESRB’s work obscure to the general
public, seriously hampering its public accountability.
Secondly, the ESRB has to report (in a more comprehensive manner) to the EU
Institutions. The ESRB is to inform the Council and the Commission of every
warning and recommendation it issues, as well as the follow-up on recommen-
dations by the addressees, or the lack thereof.
The reporting obligations to the European Parliament are different. A number
of reporting obligations are foreseen in the Regulation. The first of these stipu-
lates that the ESRB Chair has to attend an annual hearing in the Parliament. In
case of widespread financial distress, reporting should be more frequent. Sec-
ondly, the Parliament may request ad-hoc hearings of ESRB officials. Finally, the
ESRB Chair is to hold at least twice a year confidential discussions with the
Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee (ECON)80. As a result, the ECON’s Chair and Vice-Chairs will be
substantially better informed than other parliamentarians and the private sector.
This puts them in a powerful position. Despite these reporting obligations, the
Parliament will be less informed on the ESRB’s work than the Council and the
Commission, as it is not automatically informed of ESRB warnings and recom-
mendations81.
Besides its reporting obligations, the ESRB is to interact with other supervisors.
In the EU, it is to cooperate with the ESAs to identify and prioritise potential
systemic risk. Outside the EU, it is to coordinate its work with relevant interna-
tional and third country bodies82.
80. Article 19 of ibid.
81. Article 16(3) of ibid.
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3.3. Decision-making
Normal decision-making in the ESRB’s General Board consists of voting by sim-
ple majority. In addition, a quorum of two-thirds is required. However, an
extraordinary meeting can be held if the General Board fails to meet this quo-
rum. During such extraordinary meetings, decisions can be adopted with a quo-
rum of one-third83. 
Making warnings and recommendation public is an exception to these general
decision-making rules, as it requires a two-thirds majority and a fixed quorum
of two-thirds84. Despite these majority rules, the ESRB is most likely to pursue
a large consensus before emitting warnings and recommendations (see 3.4.2).
3.4. Limits
Despite the importance of the ESRB’s tasks, it faces several hurdles that could
prevent it from being effective. The limitations discussed below are likely to
become even more important as time passes and the sensed need for effective
supervision diminishes.
3.4.1. Lack of coercive power
The ESRB cannot oblige others to take its recommendations and warnings into
account. It therefore constitutes a soft law body. Such bodies can be influential,
but national, regional and international examples show that this is challeng-
ing85.
The ESRB has some strong points when drawing comparisons with other soft
law bodies. For example, it is part of the EU, which has binding powers – in
contrast to many international organisations. It furthermore has some means of
stimulating compliance, notably through the ‘act-or-explain’ approach and its
powers to publicly name and shame. Finally, EU Institutions and national super-
visors have the obligation to cooperate with the ESRB86. If they fail to do so, this
can be viewed as a violation of their obligations under EU law87.
83. Article 10 of ibid.
84. Article 18(1) of ibid.
85. See FERRAN, E., KERN, A., Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? Soft Systemic Risk Oversight Bodies
and the Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board, Working Paper Series, November 2010,
Retrievable on: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676140.
86. Article 15 (1) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, op. cit. footnote 57.
87. FERRAN, E., KERN, A., Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective?, op. cit. footnote 86, pp. 30-31.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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Even so, these strengths are on their own unlikely to sufficiently ensure any
meaningful influence. In the end, the ESRB is to rely for a major part on its
reputation, instead of on coercive powers. As a consequence, the ESRB will con-
tinuously need to labour for its voice to be heard.
3.4.2. A more than challenging task
It’s clear that the ESRB faces a daunting task. Whether deliberate or not, its
mandate remains vague. This leaves some important questions unanswered. It is
not clear whether the ESRB’s mission entails supervision of the financial sector
as such or whether it is to take into account other macro-economic evolutions,
most notably asset prices. Moreover, the ESRB’s role in crisis situations has not
been determined, despite insistence by the Economic and Financial Commit-
tee88.
Even with a better-defined mandate, the ESRB’s task would be challenging –
especially if we take into account the ESRB’s other limits. In essence, the ESRB
risks failing to perform its core tasks in the two ways. On the one hand, it may
fail to warn of a systemic risk. To this extent, many of the problems with regard
to the former supervisory system remain present after the reforms: providing an
assessment of macro-prudential risk remains an intellectually challenging task
and policymakers will continue to be doubtful of warnings that could under-
mine short-term growth. On the other hand, the ESRB could fail its tasks by
erroneously identifying a situation as posing a systemic risk.
As aforementioned, supervision is not an exact science and hence entails an ele-
ment of uncertainty. Therefore, the two types of mistakes are to some extent
unavoidable. While erroneous warnings might seem less harmful than failing to
warn of a systemic risk, multiple erroneous warnings could undermine the
ESRB’s reputation and thus its relevance89.
3.4.3. Sizeable General Board: balancing consensus and 
substance
The size of the General Board renders the work of the ESRB even more compli-
cated. It is unmistakably difficult to discuss macro-prudential matters with 66
participants around the table. This is especially true given that the ESRB dis-
88. EFC, Lessons from the financial crisis, op. cit. footnote 42, p. 11.
89. SMAGHI, L., Speech at the CEPR/ESI 13th Annual Conference on ‘Financial Supervision in an Uncer-
tain World’, European Banking Center at Venice International University, Venice, 25-26 September 2009,
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cusses sensitive, confidential matters. The former EU supervision bodies proved
to be inappropriate forums for exchanging information, due to their broad
membership90. Yet, under the current structure, the EU is certain to repeat pre-
vious mistakes. There is a real risk that the functioning of the ESRB will be
hampered as a consequence91.
Besides difficulties in exchanging information, the size of the General Board will
also make it more difficult to agree on evocative warnings. Here, the ESRB faces
a considerable dilemma. If its messages are to have a reputational effect, it
should adopt texts with a large consensus. When warnings or recommendation
lack consensus inside the Board, their validity can easily be questioned. On the
other hand, a consensus among so many participants is likely to lead to watered-
down texts, rendering them less meaningful. For the ESRB, it will be a difficult
to deliver documents that are both consensual and substantive.
3.4.4. Strong reliance on central banks
While the ESRB’s membership is inclusive in terms of Member State representa-
tion, it is less so in sectoral terms. The ESRB is dominated by central bankers
and the role of non-central bank supervisors has as a consequence been limited
considerably. In the General Board, more than three out of the four voting mem-
bers are central bankers. Furthermore, the large role of the ECB in the function-
ing of the ESRB strengthens central banks’ presence. The need for a balanced
territorial representation seems to have been detrimental to both the size of the
General Board and the sectoral representation inside the ESRB. Other bodies
that carry out macro-prudential supervision are less dependent on central bank-
ers. The international Financial Stability Board for example has a wider range
of members, including finance and economy ministries92.
The lack of diverse sectoral representation can hinder the ESRB’s ability to
detect and respond to systemic risks. While central bankers have useful informa-
tion and knowledge, they lack expertise in certain fields and do not bear respon-
sibility for financial sector crisis management93.
Equally worrying is the fact that financial stability can conflict with central
bankers’ main objective: inflation targeting. For example, tighter monetary pol-
90. EFC, Lessons from the financial crisis, op. cit. footnote 42, p. 11.
91. SIBERT, A., Systemic Risk and the ESRB, European Parliament Note, 2009, p. 6.
92. See: FSB Member Institutions, Retrievable on: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/
links.htm.
93. Treasury Committee of the UK House of Commons, Opinion on Proposals for European Financial
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icy might be advantageous for inflation reduction, but it could also run the risk
of undermining financial stability. Conversely, providing liquidity to distressed
financial institutions may stabilise the financial system, but it can also lead to
rising inflation94. This conflict of interest could potentially lead to Board mem-
bers neglecting their responsibilities as members of the ESRB’s General Board,
which is for most of them after all only a secondary responsibility.
3.4.5. Legal issues
The legal basis for the creation of the ESRB is contained in Article 114 TFEU.
This article allows for “measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have
as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market”. A leg-
islative act based on Article 114 TFEU hence needs to fulfil two requirements: 
1. it needs to contribute to the approximation of Member State provisions and 
2. it should contribute to the internal market.
Regarding the latter requirement – ‘to contribute to the internal market’-, the
Court of Justice of the European Union has shown some leniency in past cases.
The Court has allowed the use of article 114 TFEU, even if other objectives than
the mere good functioning of the internal market were unmistakably present95.
In case of the ESRB, the Regulation stipulates that “[t]he ESRB should contrib-
ute to the financial stability necessary for further financial integration in the
internal market96“. It seems more than likely that the Court of Justice would
accept that the ESRB does indeed contribute to the functioning of the internal
financial services market, as well as the internal market as a whole. This condi-
tion consequently does not seem to pose a problem.
With regard to the required approximation of Member State legislation, the
situation is less evident. The Court of Justice has – once more – interpreted this
requirement with a certain degree of flexibility. The approximation of Member
State provisions does not imply that the legislative act should only be addressed
to the Member States. Hence, a regulation (which is the legal instrument used
94. DE GREGORIO, J., Recent challenges of inflation targeting, pp. 9-13, In: Perspectives on inflation
targeting, financial stability and the global crisis, BIS Papers No 51, March 2010.
95. See for example Case C-217/04 where the Court of Justice accepted the creation of a European Net-
work and Information Security Agency and Case C-380/03 on the prohibition of advertising and sponsor-
ship of tobacco products in the printed press and broadcasting. In both cases, the Court accepted Article
114 TFEU as a legal basis, although improving the internal market was just one of the objectives. For
more detail, see: GUTMAN, K., Case C-66/04, Smoke Flavorings; Case C-436/03, SCE; & Case C-217/
04, ENISA, Columbia Journal of European Law, Winter 2006/2007.
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for the ESRB) can indeed be based on Article 114 TFEU. In addition, the legis-
lative act itself does not need to harmonise rules. The Court has accepted that
Article 114 TFEU can be used to create an EU body that merely contributes to
the harmonisation of Member State provisions, without doing so itself97.
Notwithstanding, it is uncertain whether the ESRB Regulation even indirectly
contributes to the approximation of Member State provisions. The ESRB’s
Advisory Committees do to some extent have a role in approximating Member
State provisions, but this role was not provided for in the ESRB Regulation.
Although the Court has shown leniency, it equally stated that the contribution
to the approximation of market conditions needs to be substantial, going
beyond a mere “incidental effect98“. The act should equally alter the normative
content of Member State provisions99. Here within lies the potential contradic-
tion of the ESRB Regulation with EU law. It is unclear how the ESRB alters the
content of Member State provisions, as it isn’t the ESRB’s objective, nor is it
endowed directly or indirectly with the competences to do so.
It is therefore a possibility that the Court of Justice would reject the ESRB’s legal
basis were the matter brought to court. However, this problem is not likely to
arise in the near future. There was a large consensus among Member States and
in the European Parliament on the creation of such a body. Furthermore, the
ESRB cannot directly address financial institutions, limiting the likelihood that
financial institutions would question the ESRB’s legality. Nevertheless, legal
actions against the ESRB are not excluded in the long-term. This can especially
be the case if the ESRB proves to play an important role, in which case its actions
would undoubtedly be closely scrutinised by the financial sector.
Were the legal basis of the ESRB successfully challenged, different options
would be available in order to re-create an EU macro-prudential supervisor.
Firstly, a new supervisor could be based on Article 352 TFEU. This legal basis
requires unanimity by the Council, which could potentially lead to a more lim-
ited EU macro-prudential supervisor. A second option would be to base it on
Article 127(5) or Article 127(6) TFEU. In this case, macro-prudential supervi-
sion would be conducted by the European System of Central Banks, a require-
ment which could run into opposition from non-eurozone Member States. It
97. Paragraph 44 of Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 May 2006, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-217/04,
European Court reports 2006 Page I-03771.
98. Paragraph 35 of Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 18 November 1999, Commission of the
European Communities v Council of the European Union, Case C-209/97, European Court reports 1999
Page I-08067.
99. Article 28 of Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2001, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Par-
liament and Council of the European Union, Case C-377/98, European Court reports 2001 Page I-07079.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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would equally exclude supervision of insurance undertakings, which might pre-
vent the supervisor from having a broad and encompassing view. Finally, the
new EU macro-prudential supervisor could continue to be based on Article 114
TFEU, but with the clear goal of approximating Member State provisions.
The failure to create a new macro-prudential supervisory body in the event of a
successful legal challenge would undermine the stability of the European finan-
cial system. While in the current climate, it is widely accepted that EU macro
prudential supervision is required, this may not be the case in the future. When
the effects of the financial and economic crisis will be less tangible, concern over
the safety of our financial system will gradually decline, as will the perceived
need for financial supervision. For this reason, the legal basis should be an
important element for any subsequent review of the ESRB.35
4. EU MICRO-PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
While macro-prudential supervision is an important aspect of supervision, it can
by no means replace the supervision of individual financial institutions, referred
to as micro-prudential supervision. Such supervision constitutes the first line of
defence against any financial sector difficulties. Mirroring the discussion on
macro-prudential supervision, this chapter begins with an overview of the struc-
ture of EU micro-prudential supervision (4.1), followed by a discussion of its
tasks (4.2) and decision-making rules (4.3). The chapter concludes by focussing
on the limits of EU micro-prudential supervision (4.4).
4.1. Structure
The micro-prudential arm of EU level supervision is not carried out by a single
institution, but rather by a set of EU bodies. In order to understand how it
functions, we need to look at its overall structure, as well as the internal config-
uration of the main EU micro-prudential supervisory bodies, i.e. the European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). This renewed structure builds to a large extent
upon the previous supervisory set-up.
4.1.1. Overall structure
At the EU level, micro-prudential arrangements comprise three European Super-
visory Authorities, a Joint Committee of ESAs and a Board of Appeal. Figure 3
provides an overview.
Figure 3: Structure of EU micro-prudential supervision
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The most important elements of this structure are the three ESAs, which replace
three former Lamfalussy level 3 Committees100. Each of the ESAs deals with a
specific subset of the financial sector, namely:
• the European Banking Authority (EBA): responsible for the banking sec-
tor101;
• the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA):
responsible for the insurance and occupational pensions sector, including
pension funds102;
• the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): responsible for the
securities sector and financial markets103.
The ESAs are set up as EU agencies104 and are endowed with a legal personal-
ity105. This allows them to exercise a certain degree of independence from the
EU Institutions106. Agreeing upon the ESAs’ location proved to be a major point
of contention during the legislative discussions. Eventually, it was decided that
the ESAs’ headquarters should remain at the same location as the former Lam-
falussy level 3 Committees. As a result, the EBA is located in London, the EIOPA
in Frankfurt and the ESMA in Paris107. These arrangements will be the subject
of a review, due to be completed in 2014.
The Joint Committee of ESAs deals with cross-sectoral issues, as well as finan-
cial conglomerates. It equally plays an important role in interacting with the
ESRB. It consists of representatives of the three ESAs and is chaired on a rota-
100. See 1.2.2.
101. See Article 1(2-3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing
Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, pp. 12-47, hereinafter EBA Regulation.
102. See Article 1(2-3)Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, pp. 48-83,
hereinafter EIOPA Regulation.
103. See Article 1(2-3) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/
EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, pp. 84-119, hereinafter
ESMA Regulation.
104. The Regulations themselves avoid using the word agency. In preparatory work of the Institutions,
the ESAs have however been described as such. See for example Annexe II of European Commission, Pro-
posal for a regulation establishing a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)
of 23 September 2009, COM(2009) 502 final. In addition, the Vacancy Notices for ESA posts indicates
that the ESAs are agencies, see for example: Vacancy Notice – Chairperson (Grade AD 15) – European
Supervisory Authority – European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – COM/2010/10291, OJ C
290A, 27.10.2010, pp. 17-20.
105. Recital 14 of EBA and ESMA Regulations, op. cit. footnote 102-103 and Recital 13 of EIOPA Regu-
lation, op. cit. footnote 104.
106. ANDOURA, S., TIMMERMAN, P., Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European Agen-
cies Reignited, EPIN Working Paper, nr. 19, 2008, p. 5.
107. Article 7 of EBA Regulation, op. cit. footnote 102, of ESMA Regulation, op. cit. footnote 103 and of
EIOPA Regulation, op. cit. footnote 104. Hereinafter these three Regulations are referred to as ESA Reg-
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tional basis by the ESAs’ Chairs108.The Joint Committee is the successor of
former so-called 3L3 arrangements amongst the Lamfalussy Level 3 Commit-
tees.
Given the significant role of the ESAs, a common Board of Appeal has been
established. This Board of Appeal aims to allow for a timely contestation of ESA
decisions, preceding an often cumbersome procedure before the European
Court of Justice. It comprises six members. Each ESA is to nominate two mem-
bers of the Board of Appeal from a shortlist provided by the Commission109.
Any person to which an ESA decision is addressed or who is directly and indi-
vidually affected by the decision may appeal to the Board110, which can subse-
quently confirm or invalidate an ESA decision111. The decisions made by the
Board of Appeal can be contested before the European Court of Justice112.
4.1.2. Internal organisation of the European Supervisory 
Authorities
The internal structure of the three ESAs is practically identical. They each com-
prise at a Chairperson, an Executive Director, a Board of Supervisors, a Man-
agement Board, a Committee on financial innovation and a platform for stake-
holder input. Other bodies, such as working groups, can equally be created, but
are not required by the Regulations.
The Chairperson is to be a full-time professional, which implies that the person
cannot combine his function with any other supervisory or industry functions.
The Chair heads the meetings of the Board of Supervisors and the Management
Board (see infra), but only has voting rights in the latter. He is appointed by the
Board of Supervisors for a five year period. The European Parliament can object
to this nomination, although the consequences of such an objection are not spec-
ified in the Regulations113.
An Executive Director is in charge of the daily management of the ESA. Like the
Chairperson, the director is a full-time professional, without any other positions
in government or industry. He prepares the meetings of the Management Board
108. See Section 1 of Chapter IV (Articles 54-57) of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
109. See Section 2 of Chapter IV (Articles 58-59) of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
110. In principle, an appeal does not have a suspending effect, unless decided otherwise by the Board of
Appeal.
111. Article 60 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
112. Article 61 of ibid.
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and is also charged with drafting the work programmes and designing and
implementing the ESA’s budget114.
The Board of Supervisors is the main decision-making body of each ESA. Its
members with voting rights are the heads of the relevant national public author-
ities115. The Commission, the ECB, the ESRB and the two other ESAs each have
a representative present in the Board of Supervisors, all without voting rights.
Finally, the ESA’s Executive Director and the Chairperson participate in the
Board’s meetings, equally without voting rights116. In a Union of 27, the Board
consists of 34 members.
The meetings of the Board of Supervisors are prepared by the Management
Board. The Management Board’s members with full voting rights are the ESA’s
Chairperson and six national supervisors. Furthermore, a Commission repre-
sentative participates in its meetings, but is only allowed to vote in matters that
concern the establishment of the ESA’s budget. Finally, The Executive Director
equally attends the Management Board, but has no voting rights. In total, the
Management Board has nine members. It therefore is a select group in which
preliminary decisions can be taken with relative ease117.
The relevant Regulations equally stipulate that each ESA has a Committee on
financial innovation. The Committee comprises representatives of all relevant
national supervisory authorities. It should focus on achieving a coordinated
approach to the treatment of new financial activities118. This is of major impor-
tance. Yet, the ESAs will have to define the Committee’s role more precisely if it
is to properly carry out this function.
Finally, Stakeholder Groups serve as a platform for consultation with and input
from interested parties. The EBA and the ESMA each have one Stakeholder
Group at their disposal, while the EIOPA has two119. Each Stakeholder Group
is composed of 30 members, consisting of academics and representatives from
the financial sector, their employees and consumers120. Their input is somewhat
similar to that of the ESRB’s Advisory Technical Committee.
114. Articles 51-53 of ibid.
115. If a Member State has multiple relevant public authorities, it should agree on a common representa-
tive.
116. Articles 40-44 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
117. Articles 45-47 of ibid.
118. Article 9(4) of ibid.
119. For the EBA, this is the Banking Stakeholder Group; For the ESMA, this is Securities and Markets
Stakeholder Group; for the EIOP, the two Stakeholder groups are: the Insurance and Reinsurance Stake-
holder Group and the Occupational Pensions Stakeholder Group.
120. Article 37 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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4.2. Tasks
Before discussing the European micro-supervisory bodies’ tasks, it is important
to indicate what they are not to do. The ESAs are not mandated to carry out
day-to-day supervision of financial institutions, which is the sole responsibility
of national supervisors121.
The ESAs nevertheless have a wide range of tasks to fulfil. As will become
clearer in further discussion, the ESAs’ actual powers vary considerably from
task to task. In many fields, its tasks are limited to soft law instruments and are
thus non-binding. In other fields, the ESAs are competent to take decisions that
are binding upon others – although these decisions can be challenged.
Currently, the three ESAs have almost identical tasks. However, the ESMA will
be given additional supervisory responsibilities, as well as the power to ban cer-
tain financial activities if needed (see infra). In the future, the other ESAs are
likely to be attributed new competences as well, suggesting that the ESAs’ roles
are likely to diverge over time.
4.2.1. Supervision
Although the ESAs are not to conduct daily supervision, they are tasked with
some supervisory tasks. They are notably to monitor market developments of
the market segment they supervise (e.g. the European Banking Authority moni-
tors the banking sector)122. In addition, they are to keep an eye on systemic
risk123. Both should provide an input for the ESRB.
The ESAs equally have an important role to play in stress tests, i.e. the assess-
ment of the resilience of financial institutions to adverse market develop-
ments124. While the ESAs are not tasked to conduct stress tests, they are respon-
sible for initiating and coordinating them. Such involvement of the ESAs is
aimed at increasing the coherence and credibility of EU stress tests. Previous
stress-tests, and in particular the July 2010 stress test, were seen as lacking in
trans-national consistency, hampering their quality and credibility. Mere EU
coordination alone will however not be sufficient to achieve the sought-after
results. Such results crucially require simulating severe stress situations, as well
121. Recital 9 of EBA and ESMA Regulations, op. cit. footnote 104-105 and Recital 8 of EIOPA Regula-
tion, op. cit. footnote 106.
122. Article 32(1) of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
123. Article 22 of ibid.
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as openness on the results. It is doubtful whether future stress tests will meet
these requirements125.
The way the ESAs are to collect information for their supervisory tasks is set out
by the Regulations126. ESAs are to first take into account information available
at the EU level, then request data from national supervisors and subsequently
from the Member States’ other public bodies. The ESA is only allowed to
request data from individual financial institutions if none of these other sources
provide the required information.
In addition to the aforementioned role that ESAs play regarding general super-
vision, the ESMA is set to become responsible for direct supervision of specific
financial actors. This notably includes credit rating agencies127. The Commis-
sion equally proposed supervision of derivative trade repertories by the
ESMA128. These limited supervisory competences could be a starting point for
increased micro-prudential supervision at the EU level. Nonetheless, such Euro-
pean supervision remains at present a distant prospect, as Member States cur-
rently retain firm control of their own financial supervision.
4.2.2. Developing a single EU rule book
A major goal of the ESAs is to work towards a single EU rule book129. The ESA
Regulations themselves do not define what this concept actually entails. The
Council of Ministers described the single rule book as “a core set of EU-wide
rules and standards directly applicable to all financial institutions active in the
Single Market130“. Still, the scope of such a core set remains unclear. It therefore
leaves the ESAs some room for interpretation, but can equally lead to disagree-
ment between supervisors. In any case, a single rule book does not imply a com-
plete harmonisation of all rules applicable to financial institutions. All the same,
it should lead to less divergent financial legislation across Member States. This
is to result in less regulatory arbitrage opportunities and reduced gold-plating
issues (see 1.3.2). The ESAs have two instruments at their disposal to achieve
these objectives.
125. VERON, N., EU Financial Regulatory Reform: A Status Report, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue
2010/11, December 2010, p. 2.
126. Article 35 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
127. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on
credit rating agencies, 2 June 2010, COM(2010) 289 final.
128. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and
trade repositories, 15 September 2010, COM (2010) 484 final.
129. Recitals 5 and 22 of EBA and ESMA Regulations, op. cit. footnote 104-105 and Recital 5 and 21 of
EIOPA Regulation, op. cit. footnote 106.
130. Council of the European Union, Agreed Council conclusions on Strengthening EU Financial Supervi-
sion, 10 June 2009, 10862/09, p. 5.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
41
Firstly, the ESAs can adopt non-binding guidelines and recommendations131.
The ESAs can address these guidelines and recommendations to both national
supervisors and individual financial institutions. Supervisors and financial insti-
tutions should make every effort to comply. In case of inaction, supervisors have
to provide adequate justification. For financial institutions, reporting on the
implementation is only obligatory when explicitly required by the guideline or
recommendation. These measures are to increase compliance. It does however
not take away the fact that the guidelines and recommendations have no binding
effects, exposing them to the same weaknesses as the former Lamfalussy level 3
Committees.
Secondly, the ESAs develop draft binding technical standards132, including both
regulatory and implementing standards. The latter relate to standards that need
to ensure uniform implementation of EU legislation, without amending the leg-
islation. Regulatory technical standards on the other hand do supplement or
amend a legislative act, but only those elements which are non-essential133.
The ESAs’ technical standards subsequently need to be formally endorsed by the
Commission. The power of the Commission to draft its own technical standards
is limited. It may only do so when an ESA has not submitted adequate drafts
within the established time frame. This offers the ESAs some additional power.
The European Parliament and the Council can object to a technical standard
within the proceeding three months following its adoption by the Commission.
It remains to be seen whether these institutions will be able to evaluate delegated
acts within such a limited time frame. The Parliament in particular may struggle
to operate on such a tight schedule. At any rate, the difficult balance between
the ESAs’ independence and accountability should be closely monitored.
As such, both the draft technical standards and the guidelines and recommenda-
tions are non-binding. However, the drafts do become legally binding instru-
ments and are directly applicable to financial institutions once the Commission
endorses them. Only in rare cases would the Commission not endorse such a
draft. As a consequence, the draft technical standards will have a bigger impact
on the harmonisation of financial legislation than the guidelines and recommen-
dations. All the same, neither excludes gold-plating nor regulatory arbitrage.
131. Article 16 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
132. Article 10-15 of ibid.
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4.2.3. Enforcing EU rules
Not only do the ESAs play a crucial in working towards a single rule book, they
also have substantial competences to ensure the enforcement of EU rules. An
initial way to enforce EU-rules consists of counteracting breaches of EU law by
national supervisors134. The ESAs must follow a specific procedure. Firstly, an
ESA has the right to investigate the alleged breach of EU law. Subsequently, it
can recommend action to a national authority. If this does not lead to satisfac-
tory results, the Commission can issue a formal opinion on the matter. If the
supervisor’s actions are still considered to be insufficient after this formal opin-
ion, the ESA can require financial institutions to act. It can however only do so
if 1) the EU legislation in question is directly applicable to financial institutions
(notably regulations and technical standards) and 2) the ESA’s actions are either
needed to maintain the conditions of competition in the market or to ensure the
stability of the financial system.
As a second means of enforcing EU rules, the ESAs have an active role in settling
disagreements between national authorities135. After an initial conciliation
phase, an ESA is empowered to take decisions that bind national authorities. If
national authorities still do not comply, the ESAs can take decisions addressed
to financial institutions. These decisions override decisions made by other super-
visors.
Both in counteracting breaches of EU law and the settling of disagreements, the
ESAs’ actions are only to ensure compliance with EU law. This limits the scope
of these competences. Even so, it is to be underlined that the ESAs’ binding pow-
ers in the matter imply a significant step-up in the role of EU level supervisors.
4.2.4. Preparing for and dealing with distress in the financial 
system
Moments of financial distress are unavoidable, even if the most stringent of rules
are in place. Competences have been conferred upon the ESAs that aim to
improve the handling of such situations and which should avoid the lack of
supervisory cooperation, as occurred during the financial crisis.
In the first place, the ESAs are to play a role in contingency planning. This
includes recovery, resolution and funding arrangements136. Contingency plan-
134. Article 17 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
135. Article 19-20 of ibid.
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ning should allow policymakers to deal with the failure of a financial institution
without upsetting financial stability or requiring public bailouts. The ESAs are
not to set out the basic rules, as this shall be done in the form of a legislative act.
To this extent, the Commission is to make a (not so ambitious) proposal in the
first half of 2011137. Once the legislative act is adopted, the ESAs will be able to
review the arrangements and adopt draft technical standards on the matter. It
can equally contribute to concrete arrangements among supervisors. Such
arrangements are without doubt useful and already existed before the financial
crisis. Yet, they proved very difficult to abide, resulting in national responses.
To counter national retrenchment in cases of crises, the Council can declare an
emergency situation during which the ESAs would be able to exercise supple-
mentary powers138. The Council may decide to declare an emergency situation
if developments threaten the proper functioning of the financial markets or the
financial system139. When such a situation is declared, the ESAs have the power
to require actions by national supervisors. If a national supervisor does not act
sufficiently, the ESAs can adopt decisions addressed to individual financial insti-
tutions. In this instance, the ESA’s decision would prevail over decisions taken
by the national supervisors. It should be remembered however that an ESA can
only address its decision to individual institutions if there is an incorrect appli-
cation of directly applicable EU legislation by the competent authorities.
In specific cases, the ESAs are able to temporarily restrict or ban financial activ-
ities if these pose a threat to the financial system or its markets140. This is fre-
quently believed to be the case when investors speculate massively on deterio-
rating market situations. The competence of the ESAs in this matter needs to
reduce the likelihood of unilateral restrictions, as witnessed during the financial
crisis. The extent of the ESAs’ competences depends on whether an emergency
situation has been declared. If the Council hasn’t declared an emergency situa-
tion, the ESAs only have the power to restrict or ban financial activities when
European legislation explicitly permits doing so. This is not yet the case, but
could change as the Commission has proposed to endow the ESMA with the
power to temporarily prohibit short selling and uncovered credit default
swaps141. If the Council has declared an emergency situation, the ESAs would
137. According to its 2010 Communication, the Commission is to propose rules that apply only to credit
institutions and systemically important investment banks. Cross-border cooperation would remain largely
voluntary. See: European Commission, Communication on an EU Framework or Crisis Management in
the Financial Sector, 20 October 2010, COM(2010) 579 final.
138. Article 18 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
139. The ESAs and ESRB can issue a confidential warning to the Council stating that an emergency situa-
tion may arise. See also: Article 3(2)e of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, op. cit. footnote 54
140. Article 9(5) of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
141. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit
Default Swaps, 15 September 2010, COM(2010) 482.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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yield considerably more power. In this instance, it has the ability to prohibit any
kind of financial activity. In either case, the Regulations do not impede Member
States from unilaterally restricting financial activities. This leaves the door open
for national solutions when national supervisors are not able to agree on a com-
mon approach.
Despite the ESAs’ tasks and the future EU crisis management rules, the matter
will still largely remain in the hands of national policymakers. Only they will be
able to take measures with a significant fiscal impact (see 4.4.3). Cooperation
has certainly been facilitated, but a coordinated approach will remain most chal-
lenging.
4.2.5. Advancing supervisory cooperation and convergence
The previous Lamfalussy level 3 Committees were for a major part aimed at
improving cooperation among national supervisors and aligning their practices.
The ESAs have inherited this role from these Committees, as they are to work
towards a common supervisory culture142. This is a means of increasing super-
visory cooperation in a soft way. However, the non-binding nature limits the
potential impact of these instruments.
The ESAs’ task of advancing supervisory cooperation and convergence com-
prises facilitating the exchange of information between supervisors143 and peer
review of supervisory practices144. The ESAs are equally to provide non-binding
mediation145 between national authorities – although they have binding powers
in case mediation fails (see supra).
Promoting and monitoring colleges of supervisors (see 5.1) is another way to
promote supervisory cooperation146. Of notable importance is the fact that the
ESAs can participate in the activities of colleges of supervisors. The ESAs are full
members of the colleges of supervisors, not just observers as was initially pro-
posed. Moreover, the ESAs can demand further discussions when it finds a col-
lege of supervisors’ decision inadequate. Yet, the ESAs do not have any binding
powers when it comes to decision-making in the colleges.
Finally, the ESAs are to facilitate and stimulate the delegation of tasks between
national supervisors, whereby one national supervisor takes over certain tasks
142. Article 29 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
143. Article 29(1)b of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
144. Article 30 of ibid.
145. Article 17 of ibid.
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of another supervisor147. The provisions are of a voluntary nature, but could be
a step towards altering home country supervision. Nevertheless, even in the case
of delegated tasks, the home country supervisor continues to hold final respon-
sibility.
4.2.6. Consumer protection
On the insistence of the European Parliament, the ESAs have been attributed
some responsibilities with regard to consumer protection. The ESAs’ compe-
tences involve consumer protection in the narrow sense, as well as national
guarantee schemes aimed at protecting the public against unforeseeable events.
The ESAs play a role in the protection of consumers dealing with financial prod-
ucts. The ESAs have many channels to pursue this goal, including coordinating
financial education initiatives, developing training standards for the financial
sector and helping to develop common disclosure rules. They can equally adopt
guidelines and recommendations to this extent. They again do not possess any
binding powers in the matter148.
The fact that ESAs’ have been attributed a role with regard to national guaran-
tee schemes is a consequence of these schemes’ prior inadequacies. The crisis
notably illustrated that the schemes’ coverage was rather low and that the levels
of coverage differed considerably between Member States. EU initiatives to try
to overcome these shortcomings are underway, although subject to serious
debate149. The ESAs are to contribute to an EU-wide coherent implementation
of these future rules, as well examine and improve their general functioning150.
147. Article 27 of ibid.
148. Article 9 of ibid.
149. See: European commission, Proposal for a Directive …/…/EU on Deposit Guarantee Schemes
[Recast], 12 July 2010, COM(2010)368 final; European Commission, Proposal for a Directive amending
Directive 97/9/EC on investor compensation schemes, 12 July 2010, COM(2010) 371 final and European
Commission, White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, 12 July 2010, COM(2010) 370.
150. Article 26 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104. Each ESA is to focus on a specific type of
scheme. The EBA is to contribute to deposit guarantee schemes, the ESMA to investor compensation
schemes and the EIOPA to insurance guarantee schemes. With regard to the former two (deposit and
investor guarantee schemes), the EBA and the ESMA may adopt guidelines and recommendations, as well
as technical standards. As insurance guarantee schemes are less common in the Member States, the
EIOPA is only to help assess whether an EU system is required in this domain.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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4.2.7. Reporting and contact with other public bodies
With the increased competences come increased reporting obligations. As for
the ESRB, reporting and interaction with other supervisory bodies have been
specified in the Regulations.
As for the general public, the ESAs are to publish an annual public report on
their activities. The report needs to provide information on the segment of the
financial industry which they supervise. It should furthermore include informa-
tion on the ESA’s guidelines and recommendations, including the level of com-
pliance by the Member States. It shall equally detail which supervisors have not
acted upon the ESA’s actions to counter breaches of EU law151. The report is to
a certain extent to serve as a ‘name-and-shame’ instrument.
The ESAs are to report to the European Institutions in a more rigorous manner.
This is reflected in a dialogue between the ESAs and the Institutions. At any
time, the Parliament and the Council may request a statement by an ESA Chair-
person. The Chairperson is also to respond to questions of the Members of the
European Parliament. Furthermore, the ESAs are to provide the European Par-
liament with all relevant information152.
With regard to contact with other supervisory bodies, the relation with the
European Systemic Risk Board is of prime importance. Communication
between the bodies is to be a two-way street. The ESAs are to warn the ESRB
on potential systemic risks, while they equally need to act upon warnings and
recommendations given by the ESRB153. Besides the ESRB, the ESAs may also
engage in contact with international and third country bodies, although these
contacts are not to create legal obligations154.
Finally, in its work, the ESAs are to consult with interested parties. The network
of interested parties has been formalised through Stakeholder Groups. These
Groups have to be consulted when an ESA plans to adopt draft technical stand-
ards, guidelines and recommendations155.
151. Article 43(5) of ibid.
152. Article 50 of ibid.
153. Article 36 of ibid.
154. Ibid.
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4.3. Decision-making
As a general rule, decisions by the Board of Supervisors are taken by a simple
majority of its members. In a Union of 27, this implies that a decision can be
passed when supported by 14 national supervisors. The Regulation has not
specified quorum rules. It is left to the ESAs to define these as they see fit156.
Multiple exceptions to the general voting rule have been put in place. Table 1
provides an overview of this. A qualified majority is needed in order for deci-
sions with regard to more comprehensive competences, i.e. technical standards,
the ESA’s budget and guidelines and recommendations.
Adopting decisions addressed to national supervisors in the case of settling dis-
agreements is subject to particular rules. There are particular rules when the
disagreement concerns a consolidating supervisor, i.e. a supervisor responsible
for the supervision of a banking or insurance group as a whole157. In that case,
an ESA can take decisions requiring actions by the consolidating supervisor by
simple majority of votes casted. This is unless a blocking minority rejects such a
decision. All other ESA decisions regarding the settlement of disagreements are
taken according to the general decision making rules (a simple majority of the
members).
A final particular majority rule concerns banning or restricting a financial activ-
ity. An ESA can take an initial decision by simple majority of its members. How-
ever, any Member State can request the ESA to reconsider its decision. In that
case, the ESA would have to confirm its initial decision by qualified majority.
The Regulations do, however, not specify a deadline for the ESA to reconsider
156. Article 44 of ibid.
Table 1: Matters where the General Board’s majority rule differs from the majority 
of the members rule
Matter Majority rule
Technical standards Qualified majority
Guidelines and recommendations Qualified majority
Financial provisions Qualified Majority
Binding settlement of disagreements con-
cerning consolidating supervisor decisions
Simple majority, unless blocking minority
Reconsideration of a decision to ban or res-
trict a financial activity
Qualified majority
157. Directive 2009/111/EC defines a consolidating supervisor as “the competent authority responsible
for the exercise of supervision on a consolidated basis of EU parent credit institutions and credit institu-
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its decision158. This could result in a deadlock if only a simple majority, but not
a qualified majority of the Board of Supervisors supports the ESA’s initial deci-
sion. In this case, supervisors may try to postpone the vote. A Member State can
of course go to the Board of Appeal or the Court of Justice against an improper
delay. Yet, such a procedure is also likely to be lengthy, which contrasts with the
temporary nature of the prohibition. A review of the ESA regulations should
address these inconsistencies.
By deciding most issues by simple majority, the ESAs can take decisions more
easily than previously was the case (unanimity used to be preferred). The dis-
cussed exceptions make the use of the ESAs’ most significant competences more
difficult. At the same time, they ensure broad support for these decisions, which
does make certain sense. Nevertheless, it seems detrimental that political com-
promises lead to an unnecessarily complicated set of decision-making rules.
4.4. Limits
Despite the ESAs’ significant tasks and not so very demanding decision-making
rules, its limits should not be overlooked. These do not only reduce the ESAs’
current role, but equally pose limits to the role that the ESAs can be attributed
in the future.
4.4.1. Limited supervisory role
Although the supervisory reform transformed the previous Lamfalussy level 3
Committees into European Supervisory Authorities, the actual supervisory role
of these Authorities remains limited. As aforementioned (see 4.2.1), they are
only entitled to collect information and monitor market developments, lacking
the powers to conduct day-to-day supervision. Furthermore, even if the ESAs
were to detect a problem in a financial institution, they would only be able to
force national supervisors or financial institutions to act when directly applica-
ble EU rules are violated or when an emergency situation was declared. In other
situations, it would be much more difficult for the ESAs to have a significant
influence.
Considerable direct EU supervision is currently inconceivable. Supervision is
undeniably linked to financial sector crisis management and lender of last resort
responsibilities, which have to take over when supervisors have failed to per-
158. Article 9(5) of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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form their tasks. For this reason, responsibility for financial supervision ought
to be in line with fiscal responsibilities in crisis situations159. Currently, Member
States carry the burden of crisis management (see 4.4.3). Shifting supervision
from the Member States to the EU without resolving the burden-sharing issue
would be rightly unacceptable for Member States. Furthermore, legal issues
equally prevent the ESAs to take-up more direct supervisory tasks (see 4.4.5.).
4.4.2. Procedural constraints
The ESAs have been endowed with considerable, binding competences. Yet, the
use of their competences is restricted, due to lengthy procedures and/or the
needed go-ahead by an EU Institution. This is made clear by an overview of the
ESAs’ constraints when applying five of its most significant competences:
1. The emergency powers of the ESAs can only be used after the Council
declares an emergency situation, which it will not do lightly. Furthermore,
decisions by the ESAs may not have a considerable impact on the Member
States’ fiscal responsibilities (see infra).
2. The ESAs’ technical standards are drafts. They need to be endorsed by the
Commission and even then they can be rejected by the either the Council or
the European Parliament.
3. With regard to counteracting a breach of EU law, the ESAs can only impose
its decisions upon financial institutions and national supervisors when the
Commission adopted a formal opinion. Additional requirements need to be
fulfilled before an ESA can address a financial institution.
4. When settling a disagreement between national supervisors, the ESAs must
allow for a conciliation phase, which can take considerable time. After this
phase it first has to address the national supervisors before it can require
action from individual institutions. At any rate, the ESAs’ decisions may not
have considerable impact on the Member States’ fiscal responsibilities (see
infra).
5. An ESA can only ban or restrict a financial activity if specifically foreseen by
EU legislation or when an emergency situation is declared. If an ESA bans or
restricts a financial activity, any Member State can request a confirmation of
this decision. In that case, a qualified majority in the ESA’s General Board is
needed to confirm the decision.
As a consequence, most of the ESAs’ binding powers are only to serve as instru-
ments of last resort. These powers are likely to be used scarcely. The ESAs’ com-
159. GOODHART, C., Some New Directions for Financial Stability?, Per Jacobsson Lecture, Bank for
International Settlements, 2004, pp. 7-8.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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petence to adopt draft technical standards is an important exception and is
likely to constitute one of the ESAs’ most prominent competences.
4.4.3. Safeguards protecting national fiscal autonomy
During the European Council of June 2009 some countries where concerned
about the ESAs powers. In response, a safeguard clause was introduced into the
Regulations160. The clause limits the fiscal repercussions of ESA decisions in two
fields: emergency situations and the settlement of disagreements. In both fields,
the safeguard clause stipulates that an ESA decision shall not impinge on a
Member States’ fiscal responsibilities, thus limiting the pecuniary repercussions
of the ESAs’ decisions. This is especially relevant in case of a bail-out of a cross-
border financial institution. During the financial crisis, Member States were
almost never able to agree on burden sharing arrangements when financial insti-
tutions needed to be refinanced. Due to the safeguard clause, the ESAs will be
little more than a forum for such agreements.
The safeguard clause is initiated by the non-implementation of an ESA decision
by a Member State on grounds of its fiscal impact on that Member State. The
ESA decision is then immediately suspended. The procedure that follows
depends on whether the safeguard clause is used in an emergency situation or in
case of the settlement of a disagreement, with some similarities existing between
the two. In a nutshell, when settling disagreements, an ESA decision is revoked
unless a majority of Member States supports the ESA decision. If an emergency
situation has been declared, than the opposite applies. In such instances, an ESA
decision is maintained unless the Council decides otherwise. Both procedures
are detailed below.
a. The settlement of disagreements
The procedure that is followed when settling disagreements is the less complex
of the two processes. Table 2 provides an overview of the procedure and time
frame. In case of settling a disagreement, the safeguard procedure consists of
three steps. It begins when a Member State notifies the ESA, within two weeks
of the decision, of the non-implementation of the ESA decision.
160. Article 38 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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Following the Member States’ notification, the ESA has one month to decide
whether to maintain, amend or suspend its decision. In case the ESA decides to
maintain the decision, this must be confirmed by the Council within two
months. To this extent, the Council votes by simple majority of votes casted.
b. Emergency situations
In case of an emergency situation, the safeguard procedure starts again with a
Member State notifying the ESA that it has not implemented an ESA decision.
Due to the urgent nature of emergency situations, a notification has to occur
within three working days of the ESA decision.
The Council can subsequently revoke the ESA decision by a simple majority of
its Members. If the Council takes no such measures within ten working days
after the notification by the Member State, the decision is no longer suspended.
However, Member States are entitled to readdress the Council a second time if
this institution has chosen not to revoke an ESA decision. The ESA decision
would nonetheless remain in force during the remainder of the procedure. For
this second deliberation, the Council would in practice be composed of the
heads of state or government, although this is not a legal requirement. The
Council has four weeks to bring forth a decision, a time frame which can be
extended by another four weeks if the situation so requires. Table 3 provides an
overview of the procedure.
Table 2: Procedure and time frame for applying the safeguard clause in case of 
dispute settlement
Step in the procedure Time frame
1. Member State notifies the non-implementation of a 
decision
2 weeks
2. ESA decides to maintain, amends or suspend its decision 1 month
3. If the ESA maintains its decision, Council needs to 
confirm this decision
2 months
Table 3: Procedure and time frame for applying the safeguard clause in case of 
emergency situations
Step in the procedure Time frame
1. MS notifies ESA on the non-
implementation of the decision
3 working days
2. Council decides whether the ESA decision 
is maintained or revoked
10 working days
3. Council re-examines its decision 4 weeks (extendable by another 4 weeks)RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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4.4.4. Budgetary and staffing constraints
Unlike the ESRB, the ESAs have their own budget. The ESAs’ resources come
from national supervisors (60%) and from the Union budget (40%)161. In addi-
tion, legislators can require fees from the financial sector, which then are supple-
mented to the ESAs’ budgets. This is the case for credit rating agencies, whose
fees will be added to the ESMA budget162. It has been argued that the ESAs’
budgets and staff are very small compared to the tasks they have to perform163.
Table 4 shows the ESAs’ initial 2011 budget and their 2015 budget, when the
ESAs are to be fully operational.
Table 4: ESAs’ 2011 and 2015 budgets in EUR164
A total 2015 budget of over EUR 68 million might seem impressive, but com-
pared to national supervisors’ budgets this is in fact rather small. In comparison,
the British Financial Services Authority’s 2009 operating costs were approxi-
mately EUR 450 million165 and the German BaFin budget was EUR 129 mil-
lion166. This is also reflected in terms of staff. By 2015, the combined staffing of
the ESAs will be around 300, in contrast to the 3.300 employees of the British
Supervisor167. Of course, a comparison between the EU and the national level is
imperfect, as the two levels have different tasks. What the figures in any case do
show is that national supervisors are by far the more dominant bodies.
161. Recital 68 and Article 62 of ESA Regulations, op. cit. footnotes 102-104.
162. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on
credit rating agencies, 2 June 2010, COM(2010) 289 final.
163. Remarks by LANNOO, K., Debriefing on European Parliament Decision on the Financial Supervi-
sion Package, Centre for European Policy Studies, 27 September 2010.
ESA / Year 2011 2015
EBA  12.682.500  24.591.000 
EIOPA  10.667.500  19.955.000 
ESMA 19.460.000  23.785.000 
Total 42.810.000 68.331.000 
164. The 2011 figures are based on the EU 2011 budget, plus national contributions and sectoral fees in
case of the ESMA. 2015 figures are based on the Commission’s proposal, see: European Commission,
Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Banking Authority (EBA) of 23 September 2009, COM
(2009) 501 final.
165. The FSA’s operating costs for the period 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 were £391.7 million, see:
FSA, Annual Report 2009/2010, June 2010, p. 67, Retrievable on: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/
ar09_10/ar09_10.pdf.
166. BaFin, Jahresbericht der BaFin ´09, April 2010, p. 255, Retrievable on: http://www.bafin.de/cln_
171/nn_992916/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Service/Jahresberichte/2009/jb__2009__gesamt,tem-
plateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/jb_2009_gesamt.pdf.
167. European Commission, Financial Supervision Package – Frequently Asked Questions, 22 September
2010, MEMO/10/434.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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4.4.5. Legal issues
As for the ESRB, the legal basis for the creation of the ESAs is contained within
Article 114 TFEU. As aforementioned, this Article can only be used as a legal
basis for an act that serves to ‘approximate’ Member States’ legislation. In con-
trast with the ESRB, this requirement seems to be easily met, as the ESAs have
the task of working towards a single rule book (see 4.2.2).
The ESAs’ legal nature could pose more difficulties. As already mentioned, ESAs
are created as EU agencies, each with a distinct legal personality. Delegating
powers to independent agencies poses certain issues concerning accountability,
a subject frequently discussed in economic and political theory. Therefore, the
delegation of tasks is often subjected to control mechanisms and delegation lim-
its.
In the EU such issues arise as well, as agencies operate outside of the institutional
framework provided by the Treaty168. Case law has filled in this legal gap. The
1958 Meroni Cases are of crucial importance169. They set out multiple condi-
tions for the establishment and functioning of agencies, which have become
known as the Meroni Doctrine.
The conditions of the Meroni Doctrine are quite stringent and pose significant
limits to the establishment of agencies. For this reason, the scope of agencies’
tasks is limited to specialised and often technocratic matters170. In case of the
ESAs, two interlinked conditions are of particular are particularly pertinent. As
a first condition, the delegation of power can only involve clearly defined exec-
utive powers171. Secondly, any assessment by an agency on its own authority
must be subject to precise rules so as to exclude arbitrary decision-making172.
Most tasks undertaken by the ESAs do not pose legal issues. For example, the
fact that the ESAs draft technical standards is not contrary to EU law, as it is the
Commission who officially endorses them and thus carries the responsibility.
Although this continuous to pose accountability issues, it offers a loophole
around the Meroni limits.
168. ANDOURA, S., TIMMERMAN, P., Governance of the EU, op. cit. footnote 107, p. 5.
169. Joined Cases 9-56 and 10-56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community.
170. ANDOURA, S., TIMMERMAN, P., Governance of the EU, op. cit. footnote 107, p. 10.
171. Paragraph 8 of Summary of Judgment of the Court of 13 June 1958, Meroni & Co., Industrie Met-
allurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, Case 9-56.
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Certain other ESA tasks may contain elements which are less compatible with
EU law. In particular the dispositions on ensuring a consistent application of EU
rules, emergency situations and the settlement of disagreements would confer
considerable powers to the ESAs. Additional competences that are set to be con-
ferred to the ESAs in the future may equally pose problems173, although much
will depend on the final wording. For this very reason, this paper focuses on the
ESAs’ current competences. Two potential areas of difficulty can be identified.
An initial difficulty is the scope of the ESAs’ competences. Case law only allows
the delegation of clearly defined executive powers to agencies. It is therefore not
permissible to delegate broad powers. As previously outlined, the ESAs can set-
tle disagreements, enforce EU rules, ban financial activities and oblige financial
supervisors and institutions to take emergency situation measures. One might
wonder if these powers are mere executive ones, even taking into account their
rare use and the procedural constraints. At any rate, they stretch far beyond
administrative tasks.
The second potential area of difficulty concerns the ESAs’ margin of apprecia-
tion when it comes to decision-making. According the Meroni Doctrine, assess-
ment by the ESAs needs to be based on precise rules that leave no room for
discretionary decisions. It is questionable whether this is the case. Most often,
the Regulations only indicate that the ESAs’ decisions must be made in accord-
ance with the applicable legislation and/or to ensure compliance with Union
law. Such general references might be considered to be different from precise
assessment rules. Furthermore, in some cases the ESAs have the possibility – not
the obligation – of addressing financial institutions in case a national supervisor
fails to comply174. This seems to leave the ESAs some leeway when choosing the
course of action. The fact that a Board of Appeal has been created equally indi-
cates that the ESAs’ decisions or lack of decision entail a certain margin of
appreciation.
Some questions with regard to the compatibility of the ESAs’ competences with
the Meroni Doctrine can thus be raised. Yet, the relevance of the Meroni Doctrine
has been put into question. Certain authors argue that the Meroni Doctrine has
de facto been repealed175, although this is in disaccord with recent case law176. A
173. Matters that may pose problems include the direct supervision of credit rating agencies and the mar-
gin of appreciation to determine whether a derivative is to be centrally cleared. See: VERHELST, S.,
Addressing the financial crisis, op. cit. footnote 1.
174. For example, ESAs are left the choice in case of a breach of EU law and in emergency situations.
175. MAJONE, G., Managing Europeanization, p. 194, In: PETERSON, J. and SHACKLETON, M.
(ed.), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2006, 390 p.
176. For instance: Paragraphs 41-44 of Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 May 2005, Carmine
Salvatore Tralli v European Central Bank, Case C-301/02 P, European Court reports 2005 Page I-4071.RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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potentially more valid argument is that the Doctrine does not apply to the ESAs.
Several grounds support this argument. First, the Meroni judgement concerned
private bodies, while the ESAs are public ‘satellite’ bodies. Second, in case of
Meroni, it was the predecessor of the Commission (i.e. the High Authority) which
delegated its powers. Here, the Council and the Parliament delegate tasks to the
ESAs. Finally, there have been significant institutional changes since the Meroni
cases. The Meroni cases applied to the European Coal and Steel Community.
Since then European integration has changed profoundly177. These arguments are
however in no way supported by case law.
In summary, the ESAs’ competences are on the edge of what is legally feasible
under the Meroni Doctrine, maybe even stretching beyond it. Without passing
a final judgement on the matter, it seems presumptuous to assume that the Court
of Justice would undoubtedly accept the delegation of powers to the ESAs. A
renewed view of the Court of Justice on the delegation of powers could present
a legal milestone. Accepting the ESAs’ set-up could lead to an increased role for
EU agencies. However, if the Court finds the ESAs’ powers to be in violation of
EU law, it could undermine the role of the EU in micro-prudential supervision
and put the legal arrangements of several other agencies into question of as well.
Such consequences could be far reaching.
177. OTTOW, A., VAN MEERTEN, H., The proposals for the European Supervisory Authorities: the
right (legal) way forward? in: Tijdschrift voor Financieel recht, Deventer, 2010, no. 1/2, pp. 5-16 and
DEHOUSSE, R., Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance, New York Univer-
sity, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/02, 2002, pp. 12-13.57
5. NATIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISION
While the legislative reforms draw attention to EU level supervisors, they are in
no way the only supervisors operating in the EU. In fact, EU supervisors form
only a small part of the European supervisory landscape. Actual supervision of
financial institutions is carried out by other supervisors. With regard to cross-
border supervision, the role of colleges of supervisors has been strengthened
(5.1). Yet, these colleges and the EU supervisory bodies have not replaced the
pivotal role of national supervisors (5.2).
5.1. Cross-border Colleges of Supervisors: 
Strengthened, but Feeble
Alongside the EU supervisors, colleges of supervisors are likely to be one of the
main innovations in financial supervision resulting from the financial crisis.
Such college of supervisors brings together the different supervisors of the Mem-
ber States in which a given financial institution or conglomerate operates. In
these colleges, national supervisors are to strive towards a consensus on super-
visory decisions regarding a financial institution. As a consequence of the finan-
cial crisis, colleges of supervisors have become mandatory for multinational
financial institutions178. By 2010, more than 100 supervisory colleges had been
created in the European Economic Area179.
As aforementioned, the ESAs can participate in the meetings of colleges of
supervisors (see 4.2.5), although the home supervisor chairs the meeting. While
a home country supervisor needs to take the opinion of other supervisors into
account, they ultimately have the final say. A college of supervisors does, there-
fore, not substitute national supervision.
The rise of colleges of supervisors is an important progress. Indeed, close cross-
border cooperation between supervisors is vital. Yet, their weakness lies in the
voluntary nature of cooperation. Rendering the colleges mandatory is a first step
towards closer cooperation. Providing the ESAs with mediation competences is
another important step. However, neither guarantees effective cross-border
supervision. To achieve this, more binding forms of supervisory coordination
would have to be envisaged.
178. Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions [recast], OJ L 48, 30.3.2010, pp. 1-252. This obligation applies to financial
institutions that are supervised by a consolidating supervisor; see Article 42a of the Directive.
179. CEIOPS, List of groups for which a College of supervisors is in place, February 2010, Retrievable on:
https://eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/publications/reports/20100201-CEIOPS-List-of-groups-
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5.2. National Supervision: Where the Actual Power 
Lies
As for the other supervisory bodies, the crisis has induced important changes in
national supervisory structures. Several Member States have revised their super-
visory models, introduced or upgraded macro-prudential supervision and
increased the role of central banks.
However, evolutions in different Member States are not always in line with one
another. The way in which national supervision is organised is left to the Mem-
ber States. As was the case before the financial crisis, the national supervisors’
structure, competences and independence differ considerably180.
Although the national supervisors are at the bottom of the supervisory system
and have diverging structures, they continue to stretch out far above others
supervisors in terms of competences. National supervisors’ main task is to carry
out day-to-day micro-prudential supervision, i.e. verify whether individual
financial institutions are abiding by the relevant rules and are in sound financial
health. They thus carry out the bulk of supervision related work.
Not only do national supervisors undertake the bulk of supervision tasks, they
are also the central figures in the cross-border and European supervisory bodies.
Colleges of supervisors are almost exclusively made up of the relevant national
supervisors. National representatives equally dominate the EU bodies. The
cross-border and EU level bodies are therefore no supranational entities.
Despite their pivotal role, national supervisors’ powers still have their limits.
The enhanced competences of EU micro-prudential supervisors imply that
national supervisors can be overruled. Furthermore, the single rule book and the
coordination of supervisory practices will reduce the national supervisors’ dis-
cretionary powers. National supervision will increasingly be determined by the
EU level. However, a shift from national to European supervision is as of now
unfeasible181.
180. Despite these considerable differences, three main models of supervision can be identified: (1) a sec-
toral model, where separate supervisors are responsible for supervising a specific sector of the financial
industry; (2) allocation of competences on the basis of supervisory objectives (this includes the so-called
‘twin peaks’ model) and (3) a single supervisor, which continuous to be the dominant model of supervi-
sion in the EU Member States (although some Member State plan to abandon it). See: ECB, Recent Devel-
opments in Supervisory Structures in the EU Member States (2007-10), October 2010, pp. 1-5.
181. As aforementioned, the European micro-prudential supervisors face several limits; see in particular
4.4.1 Limited supervisory role and 4.4.5 Legal issues.59
6. WHAT ABOUT INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION?
The financial sector is not only integrating at the EU level, but is increasingly
becoming an integrated international sector. The financial crisis demonstrated
the interconnectedness of the financial sector, as well as the attached dangers.
Supervision should take this evolution into account. Up to a certain extent, this
has been the case in international discussions and notably in the G-20. This has
resulted in expanded international financial supervision, both at the micro and
macro level.
At the micro level, the role of international colleges of supervisors has been
increased. Similar to EU colleges, these colleges group supervisors of multina-
tional financial institutions. The G-20 has pushed for the creation of supervisory
colleges for “all major cross-border financial institutions182“. More than thirty
of such colleges of supervisors have since been established183.
As for EU supervisory colleges, international colleges aim at improving the coor-
dination between the different supervisors. Yet, they too rely on voluntary coor-
dination. As they are not regulated by binding rules, they even have fewer com-
petences than supervisory colleges inside the EU. Due to this difference between
EU supervisory colleges and colleges at the international level, EU supervisors
often hold two-tier colleges. This implies a meeting among EU supervisors and
a separate meeting with all relevant supervisors184.
The Financial Stability Board and the International Monetary Fund have been
tasked with international macro-prudential supervision. They will jointly per-
form Early Warning Exercises on the build up of macroeconomic and financial
risks185. This exercise is to be conducted bi-annually. These Early Warning Exer-
cises are similar to the work of the ESRB, but are (even) more non-committal.
182. G-20, Declaration. Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, 15 Novem-
ber 2008.
183. G-20, Progress report on the economic and financial actions of the previous G20 Summits, July
2010.
184. CEIOPS, Report on the Functioning of the Colleges of Supervisors, 20 November 2010, Retrievable
on: https://eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/publications/reports/20101111-CEIOPS-2010-Report-
on-functioning-of-colleges.pdf.
185. G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London, 2 April 2009. Each of the two
international bodies will concentrate on its area of expertise, for the IMF this is economic and macro-
financial topics, while the FSB focuses on regulatory issues.61
CONCLUSION
The renewed financial supervision system has substantially altered the way in
which financial supervision is carried out. The reforms were undeniably needed,
and should be welcomed. Similar changes would have been inconceivable before
the financial crisis.
Of crucial importance is the enhanced role of the EU level actors. At the macro-
prudential level, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been created to
monitor the overall financial stability of the financial sector. At the micro-pru-
dential level, former supervisory bodies have been revamped into European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). The ESAs have been attributed significant com-
petences, which are even set to gradually increase over time.
Despite their increased role, these EU level bodies do face certain limitations.
The ESRB has no binding competences. Its success is, therefore, strongly
dependent on the willingness of the Member States to act upon its warnings and
recommendations. The ESAs’ role is largely limited to undertaking and promot-
ing supervisory cooperation and legislative harmonisation. Their function in
actual supervision is limited. Moreover, the instances in which the ESAs’ deci-
sions may have a sizable impact on Member States’ budgets have been limited,
hampering their role in crisis management.
Besides a strengthening of the EU level, some steps have equally been taken to
enhance cross-border and international supervision. Cross-border colleges of
supervisors have been made mandatory, while macro-prudential supervision at
the international level has been strengthened. Nonetheless, these bodies have
few means to trigger policy responses, even less than the ESRB.
Despite the increased role of other bodies, national supervisors continue to be
the core elements of financial supervision. Only they have both substantive
supervisory tasks and the competences to enforce their decisions. Moreover, the
cross-border and EU level supervisory bodies consist mostly of national super-
visors. Those bodies can, therefore, not be considered supranational entities.
As a result, the asymmetry between national financial supervision and the Euro-
pean integration of the financial sector remains. The sustainability of such asym-
metry should be a major focus of the future review, to be completed in 2014.
After this, it is highly likely that the opportunity for post-crisis reform will be
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If the review finds that a renewed supervisory system could result once again in
substantial supervisory failings, more drastic reforms are to be envisaged. This
could lead to the Europeanization of financial supervision. It would result in a
further loss of national autonomy and would require a genuine EU approach to
financial sector crisis management. More EU supervision could equally require
a change in the EU’s legal structure. Member States do not seem inclined to carry
through such changes. Yet, if the proposed supervisory system fails in its tasks,
the only real alternative to EU integration is increased national control. This
would imply cutting back the single market and would, furthermore, lead to a
less integrated financial sector, an unattractive prospect for policymakers.
In summary, while the supervisory reforms have been comprehensive, they have
not gone so far as to solve the pre-crisis supervisory shortcomings. The reforms
have rather equipped supervisors with a set of tools to address them. If these
tools proof insufficient, swift reforms must not to be shied away from, even if
they have far-reaching consequences. It should not take another financial crisis
before policymakers dare to take new far-reaching reforms.63
ANNEX: COMPOSITION OF EU SUPERVISORY BODIES
 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
Chair: Jean-Claude Trichet (ECB)
First Vice-Chair: Mervyn King (United Kingdom)
National Representatives Management Board
• Marek Belka (Poland)
• Mario Draghi (Italy)
• Athanasios Orphanides (Cyprus)
• Axel Weber (Germany)
Chair Advisory Technical Committee: Stefan Ingves (Sweden)
Head of Secretariat: Francesco Mazzaferro (ECB)
 European Banking Authority (EBA)
Chair: Andrea Enria (Italy)
National Representatives Management Board
• Martin Andersson (Sweden)
• Sabine Lautenschlager (Germany)
• Danièle Nouy (France)
• David Rozumek (Czech Republic)
• Karoly Szasz (Hungary)
• Jukka Vesala (Finland)
Executive Director: Adam Farkas (Hungary)
 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)
Chair: Gabriel Bernardino (Portugal)
National Representatives Management Board
• Peter Braumüller (Austria)
• Matthew Elderfield (Ireland)
• Damian Jaworski (Poland)
• Flavia Mazzarella (Italy)
• Jan Parner (Denmark)
• Hector Sants (United Kingdom)
Executive Director: Carlos Montalvo (Spain)RENEWED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE – FINAL OR TRANSITORY?
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 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
Chair: Steven Maijoor (Netherlands)
National Representatives Management Board
• Karl-Burkhard Caspari (Germany)
• Jean Guill (Luxembourg)
• Alexander Justham (UK)
• Raul Malmstein(Estonia)
• Kurt Pribil (Austria)
• Fernando Restoy (Spain)
Executive Director: Verena Ross (Germany186)
186. Despite her German nationality, Ms. Verena Ross was previously director at the UK’s Financial
Services Authority.